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and Donald R. Rector * ***
Since 1980 significant and extensive judicial activity in the area of credi-
tor and consumer rights has continued. Courts have reviewed a plethora
of cases involving the applicability and scope of the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices-Consumer Protection Act' and the Texas Consumer Credit Code, 2
the limitations on interest that can legally be charged in a given situation,3
and the rights of creditors to collect their debts or enforce their liens. Ad-
ditionally, the Texas Legislature has enacted extensive amendments to the
laws governing the right to contract for, charge, or receive interest on
money advanced,4 as well'as the law governing the credit sale of manufac-
tured homes.5 Accordingly, this Article summarizes and analyzes these
legislative developments and gives extensive treatment to the spate of case
law involving the two major laws in Texas governing consumer rights as
well as the important decisions delineating the rights of Texas creditors.
I. TEXAS CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
During the survey period considerable appellate activity occurred with
respect to the disclosure requirements contained in the Texas Consumer
Credit Code6 as well as the limitations it imposes on the amount of time
* B.A., Duke University; M.B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., Southern
Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., J.D., University of Texas; Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas,
Texas.
*** B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; J.D., College of William
and Mary; Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas, Texas.
**** B.B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas,
Texas.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
2. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-2.01 to--8.06 (Vernon 1971 & Pam. Supp.
1971-1981).
3. Id. arts. 5069-1.01 to-l.06.
4. See note 191 infra.
5. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-6A.01 to-6A.17 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-
1981).
6. Id. arts. 5069-2.01 to-8.06 (Vernon 1971 & Pam. Supp. 1971-1981). The disclo-
sure requirements of the Credit Code are contained in Chapters 3 (regulated loans), 4 (in-
stallment loans), 5 (secondary mortgage loans), 6 (retail installment sales), 6A (sales of
manufactured homes), and 7 (sales of motor vehicles). See notes 34-48 infra and accompa-
nying text.
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price differential that can be legally charged.7 Additionally, the Texas
Legislature enacted a new chapter of the Credit Code to govern all sales of
manufactured homes.8
A. Legislative Developments
In 1979 the Texas Legislature added chapter 6A to the Credit Code to
govern all installment sales of manufactured homes.9 This new law was
amended extensively in 1981 and the amendments became effective Sep-
tember 1, 1981.10 As amended, chapter 6A now permits sellers of manu-
factured homes to charge interest or time price differential equal to 13.32%
per year on the unpaid balance of the indebtedness for the scheduled term
of the transaction." The parties, however, can agree by express written
agreement to have the contract provide for the time price differential to be
adjusted at certain regular intervals throughout the contract.' 2 This ad-
justable time price differential must be based on changes in specific per-
mitted indices.' 3 In addition to meeting the requirements of the Credit
Code, the creditor must comply with all applicable requirements of part I
of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (the Truth-in-Lending
Act).' 4 The amendment further provides that when real estate is
purchased by the consumer at the same time as, or in conjunction with, the
purchase of the manufactured home, with the agreement that the manufac-
tured home will be attached to the real estate within a reasonable time, the
real estate may be considered a part of the credit transaction and included
in the cash price even if the real estate and the manufactured home are
sold by separate parties.' 5
B. Case Law
Many cases involving claims by consumers that lenders or sellers vio-
lated various provisions of the Credit Code were decided during the survey
period. The majority of these cases involved allegations that sellers either
(a) attempted, by clauses in their contracts, to force buyers to waive rights
they possessed against the sellers for the commission of illegal acts during
payment collections or during repossession of the property securing the
credit transaction; (b) failed to disclose the rights and obligations of buyers
7. See notes 73-78 infra and accompanying text.
8. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-6A.01 to-A.17 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-
1981).
9. Id. Manufactured housing is defined as "a mobile home or a modular home or
both." Id. art. 5221f, § 3(s). A mobile home is a transportable structure containing at least
320 square feet built on a permanent chassis. Id. § 3(a). A modular home is a dwelling
consisting of two or more modules, manufactured at a location other than the homesite,
designed to be installed on a permanent foundation. Id. § 3(q).
10. See id. arts. 5069-6A.01 to-6A. 17.
11. Id. art. 5069--6A.03(l).
12. Id. art. 5069-6A.03(3).
13. Id. art. 5069-6A.04(l).
14. Id. art. 5069--6A.05(l). The applicable provisions of the federal consumer Credit
Protection Act are found at 15 U.S.C. 1601-1891 (1976).
15. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6A.I1(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
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concerning the need to acquire or provide insurance; (c) improperly re-
tained the right to accelerate the indebtedness due upon a buyer's default;
or (d) utilized language in the acceleration clause that incorrectly entitled
themselves to the collection of excess time price differential.
Waiver Clause Violations. Numerous cases involved claims of buyers that
the seller had violated section 7.07(4),16 which prohibits any clause in a
retail installment contract for a motor vehicle 17 that purports to provide
for a waiver of a buyer's rights against the seller for any illegal act commit-
ted in the collection of payments or in the repossession of the vehicle se-
curing the credit transaction.' 8
The Texas Supreme Court in Zapata v. Ford Motor Credit Co. ,19 re-
viewed a standard waiver clause contained in the defendant's automobile
credit purchase contracts. The clause in question provided that "[a]ny per-
sonalty in or attached to the property when repossessed may be held by
Seller without liability and Buyer shall be deemed to have waived any
claim thereto unless written demand by certified mail is made upon Seller
within 24 hours after repossession."'20 The buyer contended that the part
of the clause providing waiver by the buyer violated section 7.07. Both
parties in Zapata conceded that as to the personalty in a repossessed vehi-
cle the first part of the waiver clause merely restated the common law
bailor-bailee relationship. The court noted, however, that a person in law-
ful possession of personalty might still be guilty of trespass or conversion
for its unlawful detention, and determined that the waiver clause waived
the buyer's right of action for the wrongful detention of unsecured person-
alty taken in repossession of a motor vehicle.2 ' The fact that the wrongful
detention waived by the clause did not occur until at least 24 hours after
repossession, 22 and not in the repossession as required in section 7.07(4),23
was immaterial, the court believed, because the doctrine of trespass ab ini-
tio was followed in Texas.24 The court, therefore, affirmed the judgment
of the trial court.25
16. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(4).
17. Id. art. 5069-7.01(a) defines a motor vehicle as including automobiles, mobile
homes, trucks, truck tractors and trailers, and buses.
18. Id. art. 5069-7.07(4).
19. 615 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1981).
20. Id. at 200.
21. Id. at 201. The court stated that when the owner of personalty demands its return
from a person who lawfully obtained it, retention of the personalty constitutes a trespass,
and may constitute a conversion if the retention seriously interferes with the owner's right of
control. Id; see Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cole, 503 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Forth Worth 1973, writ dism'd) (contracts purporting to waive sellers' liability for conver-
sion of unsecured property of mortgagor unenforceable as contrary to public policy).
22. For the language of the clause in question, see text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
23. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(4) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
24. 615 S.W.2d at 202. The court cites Humphreys Oil Co. v. Liles, 262 S.W. 1058, 1064
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1924), af'd, 277 S.W. 100 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgmt
adopted), which defines trespass ab initio as occurring when a lawful entry is made or prop-
erty taken followed by an abuse of the authority to enter or possess.
25. 615 S.W.2d at 202.
1982]
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In Redmac Leases, Inc. v. Lessner26 the defendant's contract provided
that any personalty contained in the vehicle repossessed could "be held
temporarily by seller without liability for return to buyer."'27 The court
determined that this provision did not violate section 7.07(4) based upon
its earlier decision in Tradewinds Ford Sales, Inc. v. Caskey. 28 After the
Texas Supreme Court reversed Tradewinds, the court of civil appeals re-
considered the contractual clause in Redmac Leases and determined that
the clause did not provide for waiver of claims on behalf of the buyer.29
Instead, the court construed the subject clause to mean that the seller was
to return such personalty to the buyer after any temporary holding and
that there would be no liability for such temporary holding.30 The court
determined that the clause merely restated the bailor-bailee relationship
existing at common law and did not violate section 7.07(4).31
The court in Redmac Leases also reviewed a provision in the subject
contract that provided that the "[s]eller shall have the right to repossess the
property wherever the same may be found with free right of entry."'32 The
buyer had alleged that the quoted language violated section 7.07(3) of the
Credit Code prohibiting a retail installment contract from "[authorizing]
the seller or holder or other person acting on his behalf to enter upon the
buyer's premises in violation of Chapter 9, Business and Commerce Code,
or to commit any breach of the peace in the repossession of a motor vehi-
cle."'33 The court determined that the contractual provision did not au-
thorize the appellant to enter the appellee's premises unlawfully or to
commit a breach of the peace in the repossession of the vehicle. 34 Reading
the "free right of entry" language in the contract to limit the seller to his
right of repossession found under the Texas Business and Commerce
Code,35 the court determined that the contract language meant that the
seller could exercise its right to repossession only if the property were
found with free right of entry.36
Insurance Disclosure Violations. Section 7.06 of the Credit Code provides
that a retail installment contract for the purchase of a motor vehicle may
include a request or requirement that the buyer provide credit life insur-
ance, credit health insurance, credit accident insurance, and property casu-
26. 616 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27. Id. at 628.
28. 600 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980), rev'd, 616 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1981).
29. 616 S.W.2d at 629-30.
30. Id. at 630.
31. Id. at 629-30.
32. Id. at 628.
33. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(3) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
34. 616 S.W.2d at 629.
35. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides that a secured
party has the right to take possession of the collateral upon default by the debtor unless the
parties have agreed to the contrary. This section also provides that "[i]n taking possession a
secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace or may proceed by action." Id.
36. 616 S.W.2d at 629.
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alty insurance as additional protection for the contract. 37 The cost of such
insurance may be included as a separate charge in such contract.38 The
buyer and seller may also agree to include charges in their contract for
insurance coverages that cover risk of loss or liability reasonably related to
the motor vehicle, the use thereof, or business services related to the motor
vehicle if the coverages are written on policies ordinarily available to the
public and prescribed or approved by the State Board of Insurance.39
When insurance is required in connection with the contract, the seller must
furnish the buyer with a statement that clearly and conspicuously states
that insurance is required, and that the buyer has the option of furnishing
such required insurance either through existing policies or by procuring
equivalent coverage through any insurance company authorized to trans-
act business in Texas.40 If the insurance is sold or procured by the seller
and includes a premium not fixed or approved by the State Board of Insur-
ance, the seller must disclose such fact to the buyer in a written statement
giving the buyer the option for a ten-day period to furnish the required
insurance coverage either through existing policies or by procuring
equivalent insurance coverage.41
In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Syler42 the Eastland court of civil appeals
again reviewed a standard retail installment contract.43 Ford did not chal-
lenge the trial court's findings that proper hazard and collision insurance
was financed for a twelve-month period at a premium of $792, that the
applicable block was not checked in the contract to indicate that the pre-
mium for such insurance was at a rate "not fixed or approved" by the State
Board of Insurance, that insurance was procured by Progressive County
Mutual, and that Progressive County Mutual wrote insurance at rates not
fixed or approved by the State Board of Insurance. The defendant at-
tempted to cure the contract violations pursuant to section 8.01(c)(2)44 by
sending a "Correction Notice" to all of its customers prior to notification
of the alleged violation. The correction notice read:
Dear Customer,
As a result of our review of your account we note the following:
37. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
38. Id.
39. Id. art. 5069-7.06(2).
40. Id. art. 5069-7.06(3).
41. Id.
42. 615 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. For a discussion of waiver clause violations involving Ford Motor Credit Co., see
notes 19-25 supra and accompanying text.
44. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(c)(2) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981)
provides:
A person has no liability to an obligor for a violation of this Subtitle or of
Chapter 14 of this Title if prior to the effective date of the Act or within 60
days after the effective date of the Act such person corrects such violation as to
such obligor by performing the required duty or act or by refunding any
amount in excess of that authorized by law; provided, however, that such per-
son gives written notice to such obligor of such correction prior to such obligor
having given written notice of or having filed an action alleging such violation
of this Subtitle or of Chapter 14 of this Title.
19821
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
If physical damage insurance written by a county mutual insurance
company was included in your agreement, your agreement may not
have indicated that the rate charged for such insurance was not
fixed or approved by the Texas State Board of Insurance. The rate
for such insurance was not so fixed or approved. (emphasis added)
In all other respects, your agreement with us remains at [sic] stated.
Please keep this notice for your records.45
The court determined that the correction notice did not exonerate the de-
fendant pursuant to section 8.01(c)(2) because of the emphasized condi-
tional language the notice contained. 46 The defendant, therefore, was
guilty of a violation of section 7.06(3); 47 consequently, the court held the
defendant liable for the penalties imposed by section 8.01 of the Credit
Code. 48
An identical contract to that in Syler was reviewed in Portland
Tradewinds Ford v. Lugo, and was found to violate section 7.06(3) for an
additional reason.49 The contract contained a paragraph offering the
buyer physical damage insurance to be arranged for by the seller entitled
"OPTIONAL INSURANCE" that was printed in bold letters. Hidden in
the body of the paragraph, however, was the statement in regular type that
read: "Physical Damage Insurance is required by this contract." 50 The
court determined that by using the word "OPTIONAL" in bold letters the
defendant did not clearly inform the buyer that the insurance was required
by law.5' The court stated that the use of the words "OPTIONAL IN-
SURANCE" suggested that the buyer need not even buy insurance, or at
least need not read the paragraph that followed if he chose not to purchase
insurance from the seller.52 The reverse side of the contract contained a
paragraph that stated: "Buyer shall obtain and maintain at his own ex-
pense for so long as any amount remains unpaid hereunder insurance pro-
tecting the interests of Buyer and Seller against loss, damage or destruction
of or to the Property in such forms and amounts as Seller may require. '53
The court determined that the additional statement did not erase the dam-
age done by the misleading paragraph on the front page of the contract
entitled "OPTIONAL INSURANCE," and the court therefore imposed
the penalties contained in section 8.01 of the Credit Code.54
45. 615 S.W.2d at 780.
46. Id. at 781.
47. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(3) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
48. 615 S.W.2d at 781; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01 (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1971-1981).





54. Id. at 29-30. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1971-1981) provides that "[a]ny person who violates this Subtitle by contracting for, charg-
ing or receiving interest, time price differential or other charges which are greater than the
amount authorized. . . shall forfeit to the obligor twice the amount of interest or time price
differential. . . and reasonable attorneys' fees fixed by the court."
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Right o/Acceleration. The Credit Code provides that no retail installment
contract or retail charge agreement shall allow the seller to "accelerate the
maturity of any part or all of the amount owing thereunder unless (a) the
buyer is in default on the performance of any of his obligations or (b) the
seller or holder in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or per-
formance is impaired."'55 A number of cases decided during the survey
period involved allegations by a borrower that the seller's retail install-
ment contract violated this provision.
The retail installment contract in Grant v. Friendly Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc. ,6 contained an acceleration provision that provided:
[I]f Buyer defaults in any payment, or fails to comply with any of the
terms or conditions of this contract, or fails to procure or maintain the
vehicle insurance required hereunder, or a proceeding in bankruptcy,
receivership or insolvency shall be instituted by or against Buyer or
his property, or if Seller deems the property in danger of misuse or
confiscation, Seller shall have the right. . . to declare the unpaid por-
tion of the Total of Payments . . . to be immediately due and
payable.5 7
Reviewing the buyer's claim that the provision violated section 7.07(1) of
the Credit Code, the court sustained the trial court's exoneration of the
defendant. The court held that the contract substantially met the require-
ments of 7.07(1) because each of the acts constituting grounds for accelera-
tion would amount to an impairment of the prospect of payment or
performance of the contract.5 8
The Corpus Christi court of civil appeals reviewed similar acceleration
and default provisions in companion cases decided the same day as Grant,
and in both cases exonerated the defendant. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
McDaniel,5 9 the acceleration clause provided that "[iun the event Buyer
defaults . . . Seller shall have the right to declare all amounts due or to
become due thereunder to be immediately due and payable . . -6o The
trial court in McDaniel held this clause violative of section 7.03 of the
Credit Code, finding that it authorized the seller in the event of default to
collect all unearned interest on the accelerated indebtedness and thereby
allowed the collection of time price differential in excess of that permitted
by law.6' The appellate court noted that the established law in Texas was
that the dominant purpose and intention of the parties embodied in the
contract were to be interpreted as a whole, in light of the attending circum-
stances and governing rules of the law, and that parties were presumed to
have intended to observe and obey the law in making a contract.62 The
55. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
56. 612 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57. Id. at 668.
58. Id. at 668-69.
59. 613 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
60. Id. at 517.
61. Id.




court stated further that for the contract to be usurious on its face, it must
clearly and positively entitle the lender, upon the happening of a contin-
gency, to exact interest at a rate greater than that allowed by law, and that
if the contract was susceptible to more than one reasonable construction,
then the construction that comported with legality should be adopted.
63
The court concluded that the clause providing for the collection of "all
amounts due or to become due hereunder" in the event of an acceleration
did not authorize the seller to collect unearned interest. 64
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Powers65 involved a default clause with the
following provision regarding acceleration:
In the event Buyer defaults in any payment, or fails to obtain or main-
tain the insurance required hereunder, orfails to comply with any other
provision hereof, or Seller in good faith believes that the prospect of
payment or performance hereunder is impaired, Seller shall have the
right to declare all amounts due or to become due hereunder to be
immediately due and payable .... 66
The court determined that the seller's right to accelerate if the buyer failed
to comply with any other provision of the contract did not exceed the au-
thority provided in section 7.07(1) of the Credit Code for a seller to accel-
erate when a buyer failed to perform "any of his obligations," and that the
reasonable meaning of the two words "provision" and "obligation" in the
context of an acceleration clause was identical.67
The buyer in Powers also alleged that the contract violated section
7.07(1) since it forbade the buyer to "transfer or otherwise dispose of any
interest in this contract of the Property" 68 and required the buyer to "keep
the Property free from all encumbrances, . . . and . . . not remove the
Property from the county of his residence without the written permission
of Seller .... ",69 Permitting acceleration for violation of these clauses,
the buyer argued, was therefore unlawful. The court noted that accelera-
tion upon a sale of encumbered collateral by the buyer without the consent
of the secured party has previously been upheld by the Texas courts.
70
The court additionally noted, however, that established precedent also
permited a buyer to transfer his interest to another party regardless of a
provision in a security agreement prohibiting any such transfer or making
such transfer an event of default.71 Although the transfer provision was
therefore unenforceable, the court stated that the acceleration clause was
not thereby rendered violative of the Credit Code because the act of re-
moving collateral from the county of the buyer's residence might justifia-
63. 613 S.W.2d at 518.
64. Id. at 518-19.
65. 613 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).




70. Id; see, e.g., A.R. Clark Inv. Co. v. Green, 375 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1964); Beaumont
Rice Mills v. Dishman, 72 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1934, writ ref'd).
71. 613 S.W.2d at 34.
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bly impair the seller's right or prospect of repayment. The court therefore
held it proper to include such a prohibition.72
Excess Time Price Differential. In Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Gibbens the
appellate court reversed and remanded the decision of the trial court
granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against the defend-
ant builder for violation of the Credit Code. 73 The plaintiffs had entered
into a contract in 1976 with the defendant that provided that the defendant
would build a new home for the plaintiffs on their unencumbered prop-
erty. The total price was to be $43,542, consisting of a cash price of
$20,860 plus a finance charge of $22,682 to be repaid in 180 monthly in-
stallments of $241.90 each. The contract disclosed that the annual percent-
age rate was 11.4%. The defendant acquired a first deed of trust lien on the
plaintiffs' previously unencumbered property to secure payment of this
debt. After an adverse holding relating to a similar contract had been
handed down,74 the defendants, attempting to take advantage of the
"cure" provisions in the Credit Code,75 sent a letter to the plaintiffs that
stated that the defendant would refund the portion of payment previously
paid and attributed to the time price differential charge that was in excess
of an annual percentage rate of 10%, and would decrease the amount of
future monthly payments to reflect the reduction of the time price differen-
tial to an annual percentage rate of 10%.
The court rejected the defendant's position that the transaction involved
was not a chapter 6 transaction.76 Assuming the defendant was guilty of a
violation of the Credit Code in the original transaction, however, the court
agreed that the violation had been cured. Because the defendant had re-
funded the excess time price differential it had previously collected and
had amended its contract to comply with the Credit Code,77 the court
found no reason to assess a penalty against the defendant for retaining a
first lien on the plaintiffs' property.78
72. Id See also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Gamez, 617 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Brown, 617 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Peden v. Ryan Oldsmobile, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
73. 608 S.W.2d 706, 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. The contract involved in Gibbens was virtually identical to the one previously re-
viewed by the San Antonio court of civil appeals in Anguiano v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc.,
561 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ refd n.r.e.), in which the court
held that a finance charge was "'time price differential'" and not "'interest,' " and therefore
chapter 6 of the Credit Code governed. Id. at 251-52.
75. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(c)(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
76. 608 S.W.2d at 709.
77. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.05(7) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981) re-
quires that no retail installment contract shall:
[p]rovide for or grant a first lien upon real estate to secure such obligation,
except. .. (b) such lien as is provided for or granted by a contract or series of
contracts for the sale or construction and sale of a structure to be used as a
residence so long as the time price differential does not exceed an annual per-
centage rate permitted under.. . this Chapter ....
78. 608 S.W.2d at 713. An identical contract provision was examined in Jim Walter
Homes, Inc. v. White, 617 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ), and the
1982]
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Defenses. The Fifth Circuit examined the bona fide error defense pro-
vided by the Credit Code79 in LaPetina v. Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. 80
In 1978 the plaintiffs purchased a 1974 model commercial tractor truck.
The amount of time price differential that a creditor could charge was de-
pendant upon the age of the vehicle purchased. 8 In computing the maxi-
mum allowable time price differential, a new employee of the defendant
erroneously calculated the age of the truck and consequently employed a
rate in excess of the statutory maximum. In the district court the defend-
ants successfully maintained that, although they admittedly contracted for
excess time price differential in a motor vehicle retail installment contract,
the charge was a result of a "bona fide error" and was therefore excusable
pursuant to section 8.01(f) of the Credit Code.8 2
The Fifth Circuit determined that the defendant's mistake resulted from
its agent's misreading of the applicable provision of the Credit Code rather
than clerical error.8 3 Noting that Texas courts had not reached the precise
question of whether a good faith misreading of the Credit Code consti-
tuted a defense under section 8.01(0, the Fifth Circuit indicated that the
bona fide error defense does not protect creditors who intended to contract
for, charge, or receive the interest rate at issue merely because those credi-
tors did not understand that the rate was in fact excessive.84 The court
held that the determinative question was whether a creditor intended to
charge the rate at issue and not whether a creditor intended the rate to be
excessive;85 the creditor's good faith mistake as to the rate allowed by the
statute therefore could not constitute an excusable bona fide error. 86
The court in Seitz v. Lamar Savings Association8 7 strictly construed the
bona fide error defense contained in section 8.01() of the Credit Code.
The defendant savings association accelerated a note, and despite com-
puter methodology designed to prevent collection of unearned interest,
collected unearned interest from the borrower when he paid the balance
due upon demand. When the defendant attempted to credit the plaintifi's
account by the amount tendered on demand, the association's computer
court similarly found that any violation had been cured by the defendant who had refunded
the excess time price differential and amended the contract as to future time price differen-
tial payments to comply with the Credit Code requirements. See also Jim Walter Homes,
Inc. v. Chapa, 614 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
79. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(f) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981) pro-
vides that:
[a] person may not be held liable in any action brought under this Article for a
violation of this Subtitle . . . if such person shows by a preponderance of
evidence that (1) the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona
fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted
to avoid such violation. ....
80. 648 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.03(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
82. 648 F.2d at 283.
83. Id. at 288.
84. Id. at 286-87.
85. Id. at 287.
86. 1d. at 288. /
87. 618 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
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rejected the amount of payment as excessive, yet the defendant did not
notify plaintiff of the overpayment or refund the unearned interest for an
unspecified period of time. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
charged and received usurious interest, and the defendant claimed the
bona fide error defense. The court stated that a major factor in determin-
ing whether the bona fide error defense was available was whether the
defendant has enacted and utilized procedures "'reasonably adopted to
avoid such violation.' "88 Further, the court noted that while the defend-
ant's procedures might have caught violations after they occurred, such
procedures were not reasonably adopted to avoid a violation before the
fact. No procedure existed to prevent the defendant from collecting
unearned interest, although procedures did exist for the defendant to pre-
vent the collection from becoming irretrievable.8 9 The court, therefore, re-
versed the trial court and rendered judgment for the plaintiff.90
The Dallas court of civil appeals in Ballard v. Hillcrest State Bank 9'
denied the use of the bona fide error defense. In Ballard the plaintiff
claimed that the failure of the bank to give him a copy of the credit life
insurance policy that he provided as security for a loan made to him by the
bank was a violation of section 4.02 of the Credit Code. 92 The bank at-
tempted to avail itself of the bona fide error defense in seeking exoneration
from the district court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The appellate
court held that because the jury found that the defendant bank had not
adopted reasonable procedures to avoid violations of the Credit Code, the
bank could not take advantage of the bona fide error defense.93
An example of an effective defense is found in Garner v. East Texas
National Bank.94 The maker of a note and his wife brought an action
against the defendant bank, seeking damages under both the Credit Code
and the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act95 for the failure of the original
creditor, who had transferred his interest in the note to the bank, to make
proper disclosure of terms and conditions of credit. The court upheld the
admission of parol evidence to show that the transfer of the note from the
contractor to the bank was intended to create a security interest in favor of
the bank rather than to effect an absolute assignment, despite the fact that
88. Id. at 147 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 146. As noted by the court, the defendant might have been successful had it
claimed a defense under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1971-1981), which provides that "'there shall be no penalty for any usurious interest which
results from an accidental and bona fide error.'" 618 S.W.2d at 144 n.3. That provision
easily avoids the cybernetic gymnastics necessary when trying to prove bona fide error under
§8.01(0.
90. 618 S.W.2d at 147.
91. 592 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
92. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-4.02(5) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
The lender must deliver the policy or certificate of insurance to the borrower within 30 days.
Id.
93. 592 S.W.2d at 374.
94. 608 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(d) (1976).
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the defendant bank subsequently extended and renewed the subject note.96
The court held that the bank was not a "subsequent assignee" 97 of the
contractor but a holder of a mere security interest in the note, thereby ab-
solving the bank of any liability under the consumer credit laws.98
Miscellaneous. The proper reading of the statute of limitations on actions
for violations of the Credit Code was decided in Quintanilla v. Harlingen
National Bank.99 Section 8.04 of the Credit. Code provides that "all such
actions. . . shall be brought. . . within four years of the date of the loan
or retail installment transaction, or within two years from the date of the
final entry thereon, whichever is later."'l  The plaintiff in Quintanila ar-
gued that the alternative language in section 8.04 providing for an action
to be brought within the latter of either four years from the date of the
transaction or "two years from the date of the final entry thereon" meant
that in the case of an alleged "continuing violation," such as when a lender
charged in excess of the statutorily permissible time price differential, the
statute of limitations did not begin to run until the final payment that in-
cluded excess time price differential was made and accepted by the lender.
The court rejected this argument, and determined that the phrase "from
the date of the final entry thereon" should be interpreted to mean when the
final physical entry was made on the document.' 0 ' Therefore, if any
blanks are left incomplete in a contract on the date of execution, the date
on which such blanks are completed commences the running of the alter-
nate two-year limitations period.
Finally, in Ciminelli v. Ford Motor Credit Co. the Texas Supreme Court
determined that a co-signor on a buyer's note could bring an action against
the lendor for violation of the Credit Code.'0 2 The co-signor was the
buyer's employer, and co-signed the note merely to lend his creditworthi-
ness to the buyer in order to enable the buyer to obtain financing for the
purchase of the vehicle. After default by the buyer and repossession by the
lender, the plaintiff co-signor attempted unsuccessfully to pay off the note
in order to obtain rights to the automobile. The plaintiff thereafter sued
the lender for violation of the disclosure requirements contained in the
Credit Code. '0 3 Summary judgment in favor of the defendant was entered
and the plaintiff co-signor appealed. The court of civil appeals ruled that
the plaintiff was essentially a "guarantor" of the indebtedness and was not
a "retail buyer" entitled to protection under chapter 7 of the Credit Code
96. 608 S.W.2d at 942; see Hillcrest State Bank v. Bankers Leasing Corp., 544 S.W.2d
727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(d) (1976) provides that with certain exceptions any action which
may be brought under the section against the initial creditor in a credit transaction in which
a security interest is taken in real property may be maintained against any of the initial
creditor's subsequent assignees.
98. 608 S.W.2d at 941-44.
99. 612 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
100. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.04(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
101. 612 S.W.2d at 675.
102. 624 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1981).
103. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.02 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
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and could not maintain a suit for damages thereunder.10 4 The supreme
court reversed, holding that Ciminelli qualified as a buyer under chapter 7
of the Credit Code when he signed the contract as a co-buyer. 10 5 Addi-
tionally, the court found that a person signing a motor vehicle installment
contract as a co-buyer, who becomes primarily liable on the contract after
the buyer's default, was an obligor as required by chapter 8 of the Credit
Code to recover penalties.106
II. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES--CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
A. Legislative Developments
As reviewed in the 1980 Survey article, the Sixty-Sixth Legislature made
numerous amendments in 1979 to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).10 7 The Texas Legislature again
amended the DTPA in 1981. Section 17.42 regarding waivers now
provides:
Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this subchapter is con-
trary to public policy and is unenforceable and void; provided, how-
ever, that a consumer, other than the State of Texas or any political
subdivision thereof, with assets of at least $25,000,000 or more at the
time of such transactions, acts, or practices, may by written contract
waive the provisions of this subchapter, other than Section 17.55A. 10 8
This legislative enactment clearly indicates an awareness that the original
purpose for the DTPA was to protect true "consumers" from unscrupulous
acts undertaken by sellers of goods and services who enjoyed a superior
bargaining position. If a consumer possesses $25,000,000 worth of assets,
he hardly can be considered an unsophisticated consumer needing the pro-
tection provided by the Act.
In addition to the amendment of section 17.42 of the DTPA, the Texas
Legislature also added section 18C, providing rules governing the registra-
tion and regulation of persons who perform inspections on real property,
to article 6573a.109 Section 18C(h) now specifically designates as a decep-
tive trade practice actionable under the DTPA the performing of an in-
spection, by a person required to register as a real estate inspector,
pursuant to a written contract if the contract does not contain, in at least
10-point bold type above or adjacent to the signature of the purchaser of
the inspection, the following disclosure:
NOTICE: YOU THE BUYER HAVE OTHER RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRAC-
TICES-CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT WHICH ARE IN AD-
104. 612 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981).
105. 25 TEX. Sup. CT. J. 91, 93 (Dec. 12, 1981).
106. Id.
107. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982). For a discussion
of the extensive amendments made in 1979, see Dorsaneo, Creditor and Consumer Rights,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 253, 280-85 (1980).
108. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
109. TEX. Rv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 18C (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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DITION TO ANY REMEDY WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE
UNDER THIS CONTRACT.
FOR MORE INFORMATION CONCERNING YOUR RIGHTS,
CONTACT THE CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, YOUR LOCAL DIS-
TRICT OR COUNTY ATTORNEY, OR THE ATTORNEY OF
YOUR CHOICE." 10
A violation of this requirement is deemed a per se deceptive trade practice
and entitles any aggrieved person to the greater of either an award of
$1,000 as a civil penalty or actual damages sustained, plus court costs and
reasonable attorney's fees."'
B. Case Law
A significant degree of judicial activity involved interpretations of the
various provisions of the DTPA.
Definition of Consumer. A number of cases decided during the survey pe-
riod examined the question of what actually constitutes a "consumer" enti-
tled to bring a private lawsuit under the DTPA. In order to avail oneself
of the protections of the DTPA, a party must be "an individual, partner-
ship, corporation, or governmental entity who seeks or acquires by
purchase or lease, any goods or services."'' 12 The cases focused on whether
or not a party sought to acquire something by "purchase" or "lease," as
well as whether the property or rights acquired constituted a "good" or
''service."
In Riverside National Bank v. Lewis 1 3 the plaintiff purchased a new au-
tomobile in 1975 and acquired financing for the purchase of this vehicle
from a third-party bank. An officer of the bank thereafter requested that
the plaintiff move the automobile loan to another bank after plaintiff had
failed to make the first payment when due. The plaintiff requested a loan
from the defendant bank. The loan officer of the defendant bank who
helped the plaintiff complete the loan application told the plaintiff that the
application would have to be approved by his superiors. Thereafter the
plaintiff was informed by the loan officer that the loan had been approved
and the loan officer requested that the plaintiff have the third-party bank
forward to the defendant a bank draft, the title, and a $6,000 certificate of
deposit that further secured the loan at the third-party bank. Though it
ultimately refused to refinance the automobile loan the defendant-bank
had required the plaintiff to execute a promissory note in the amount of
$12,871.80. At trial a stipulation was made that the bank never sought to
collect the note.
In Riverside the Texas Supreme Court considered for the first time
whether a party borrowing money from a bank was a "consumer." The
110. Id. art. 6573a, § 18C(h).
111. Id. art. 6573a, § 18C(i).
112. .TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
113. 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980).
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plaintiff in Riverside argued that any "person" ought to be entitled to sue if
aggrieved by a deceptive act. The plaintiffs argument relied upon the
broad definition of "trade" and "commerce" found in the DTPA, 114 as
well as the liberal interpretation of the Act suggested by section 17.44.115
The supreme court disagreed with the plaintiff's position, stating that the
scope of the words "trade" and "commerce" defined the acts that were
illegal but did not purport to say who could maintain a private cause of
action." 6 The court held that the definition of "consumer" delineated the
class of persons that could maintain a private cause of action, and that the
rule of liberal interpretation should not be applied in a matter that negated
the statutory definition of the word "consumer." ' 1 7 Therefore, in order to
maintain a private cause of action under the DTPA, the person had to
purchase or lease "goods" or "services."' " 8
The court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that he was a "con-
sumer," stating that the plaintiff had sought only to borrow money, and
that other than the plaintiff's payment for the use of money, there was
nothing else for which he paid or that he sought to acquire." 9 In deter-
mining whether money was a "good," the court looked to the definition of
money found in section 1.201 of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code 120 contrasting that definition to the specific definition of "goods"
found in section 2.105 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.'21 Fur-
ther, the court noted that section 9.105(a)(6) of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code provided that "goods" included all things "which are
movable at the time the security interest attaches or which are fixtures...
but does not include money .... ,,122 Therefore, the court held that the
money that the plaintiff sought to borrow from the defendant bank was not
a "good."' 123 In addition, upon reviewing the judicial definition of "serv-
114. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(6) (Vernon Supp. 1982) defines trade and
commerce as:,
the advertising, offering for sale, sale, lease, or distribution of any good or
service, of any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, and
any other article, commodity, or thing of value, wherever situated, and shall
include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the
state.
115. Id. § 17.44 provides that the Act "shall be liberally construed and applied to pro-
mote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against false, misleading, and
deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and to pro-
vide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection."
116. 603 S.W.2d at 173.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 174.
120. Id. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(24) (Vernon 1968) defines money as "a
medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government as a part
of its currency."
121. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.105(a) (Vernon 1968), defines "goods" as "all
things. . . which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than
the money in which the price is to be paid .
122. Id. § 9.105(a)(6) (emphasis added).
123. 603 S.W.2d at 174.
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ices," 124 the court determined that the plaintiffs attempt to acquire money,
or the use of money, was not an attempt to acquire services, and the plain-
tiff, therefore, was not a "consumer" entitled to relief under the DTPA. 125
Suit had been brought against a nonresident securities broker and its
employees to recover damages for alleged misrepresentations occurring
during the sale of securities in Portland Savings & Loan Association v.
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Government Securities, Inc. 126 The court, rely-
ing on section 2.105 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, 127 found
that the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to show that it was a con-
sumer of goods or services since investment securities were not goods
within the meaning of the DTPA.128 Similarly, in Bancroft v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. 129 the plaintiff was denied relief under the DTPA be-
cause she was not a "consumer." The plaintiff had contracted for a yellow
page advertisement that had been omitted. Since the defendant had not
charged her for such advertisement, the court determined that the plaintiff
had not "purchased" services from the phone company so as to be a "con-
sumer" within the meaning of the DTPA.130
The Bancroft decision is questionable, however, in light of the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc. 131 In Cam-
eron the court determined that the DTPA applied not only to deceptive
trade practices committed by persons who furnished goods or services on
which the complaint was based, but was designed to protect consumers
from any deceptive trade practices made in connection with the purchase
or lease of any goods or services. 132 Therefore, the court stated, a person
need not seek or acquire goods or services furnished by the defendant to be
a "consumer." 133 The court permitted the plaintiff-buyer to recover treble
damages from the defendant real estate agent who had represented the
seller in a real estate transaction even though the seller, not the plaintiff,
was responsible for the defendant's commissions.' 34
124. Id See also TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982),
which defines services as "work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use, including
services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods."
125. 603 S.W.2d at 175. Seealso First State Bank v. Chesskin, 613 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo), rev'don other grounds, 620 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1981); Genico Distributors,
Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 616 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. 619 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
127. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.105(a) (Vernon 1969) provides:
"Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the
money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Chapter 8) and
things in action. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and
growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in the
section on goods to be severed from realty (Section 2.107).
128. 619 S.W.2d at 245.
129. 616 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
130. Id. at 337.
131. 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981).
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Reviewing the exemptions provided by section 17.49, 35 the court held
that the DTPA did not provide an exemption for deceptive trade practices
by persons who do not furnish the goods or services on which the com-
plaint is based.136 The court noted that the Act specifically exempted from
its scope certain media owners and employees who published and dissemi-
nated deceptive advertisements of goods and services for third parties un-
less the media defendant knew of the deception in the advertisement or
had a direct or substantial financial interest in the unlawfully advertised
good or service.' 37 The court reasoned that if the DTPA already excluded
defendants who did not furnish the goods or services, as argued by the
defendants, the legislature would have had no need to exempt media de-
fendants from liability or to have provided that media defendants could be
sued in the two situations mentioned above.' 38 Since the presumption was
the the legislature never intended to do a useless act, the court determined
that the legislative intent was for the DTPA to protect consumers from
anyone indulging in any deceptive trade practice in connection with the
purchase or lease of any goods or services.' 39 The court, therefore, held
the seller's agent liable to the plaintiff for the misrepresentations it made
regarding the size of the home.' 40
Venue. In 1979 the Texas Legislature also amended the venue provisions
of the DTPA.' 41 Venue is now proper either where the defendant resides,
has his principal place of business, has a fixed and established place of
business at the time of the lawsuit, or where he committed the act or solic-
ited the transaction. 142 Several cases examined this venue provision and
grappled with the question of whether the defendant's conduct constituted
"doing business" in the county where the lawsuit had been commenced.
In Legal Security Life Insurance Co. v. Trevino 143 the Texas Supreme
Court examined the question of whether venue was proper against the de-
fendant on the sole basis that its licensed agent had made an alleged mis-
representation to the plaintiffs during the sale of a hospital policy. The
court, although faced with the venue provision of the Act as written prior
to the 1979 amendment, determined that venue was proper in the county
in which the defendant had "done business" even though the venue fact
proved was the single transaction that served as the basis of the lawsuit. 144
Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Guinn involved a complaint
against an insurer for damages resulting from the defendant's alleged fail-
ure to settle claims against its insureds within the limits of the automobile
135. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
136. 618 S.W.2d at 541.
137. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
138. 618 S.W.2d at 541.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
142. Id.
143. 605 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1980) (per curiarm).
144. Id.
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policy. 145 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant insurer had failed to
inform the plaintiffs that settlement offers had been made, that the defend-
ant had breached its implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing by
failing to settle the case within its policy limits, and that the defendant had
made a false, misleading, and deceptive representation by informing the
plaintiff that it was unnecessary to hire an attorney. As a result plaintiffs
claimed they were entitled to recover treble damages and attorney's fees
under section 17.50 of the Act.' 46
The court of civil appeals held that a plaintiff need only allege a claim to
relief under the DTPA in order to maintain venue in the county of his
residence.' 47 The defendant argued that the plaintiffs had not alleged a
claim to relief under section 17.50 because the plaintiffs were not "consum-
ers." 4 8 The court overruled that argument, noting that an insurance pol-
icy was covered by the definition of services, and that it was clear under
the allegations that the actions and representations of the defendant caused
the plaintiffs to suffer actual damages.' 49 Additionally, the court noted
that the plaintiffs expressly pled certain deceptive acts or representations
made by the defendant at the time of the issuance of the insurance pol-
icy.' 50 Stating that the DTPA was broad in scope and should be liberally
construed to protect consumers, the court ruled that venue was properly
placed because the dual requirements of section 17.56 of the DTPA had
been met; plaintiffs had alleged a claim to relief, and the defendant admit-
ted to doing business in the county.' 51
Two cases decided during the survey upheld the defendant's plea of
privilege because the facts developed at trial were insufficient to establish
that the defendants "had done business" in the respective counties in
which they were sued. In Herfort v. Hargrove15 2 the undisputed facts at
the trial court indicated that the defendant lived and had his sole place of
business in Rosenberg, Fort Bend County, selling all his jewelry from one
store. The defendant had no advertisements in either trade journals or
telephone books in Travis County, but did send receipts to customers in
Travis County if they made payments on any goods purchased in his store.
These sales receipts were sent to Travis County only after all negotiations
and sales had been made in Fort Bend County. The Austin court of civil
appeals upheld the defendant's plea of privilege, stating that the defendant
145. 608 S.W.2d 730, 730-31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ dism'd).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 731. See also T.P. Walsh Co. v. Manning, 609 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1980, no writ); Williamson v. J.V. Frank Constr., Inc., 616 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
148. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982) defines a consumer
as "an individual, partnership, corporation, or governmental entity who seeks or acquires by
purchase or lease, any goods or services."
149. 608 S.W.2d at 732.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 732-33. See also Otto, Inc. v. Cotton Salvage & Sales, Inc., 609 S.W.2d 590
(Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1980, writ dism'd).
152. 606 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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had not "done business" in Travis County.153
Similarly, in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Altreche the court reversed the
decision of the trial court overruling the defendant's plea of privilege. 54
The plaintiffs introduced into evidence at the trial court the 1979 Corpus
Christi telephone directory, which listed the defendant's advertisement
with a telephone number. The appellate court agreed that the introduction
of such telephone directory advertisements have been held in the past to be
sufficient to prove that a company had solicited business in a particular
county.155 The court determined, however, that the 1979 telephone direc-
tory, bearing dates subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit, was no evidence
that the plaintiffs had "done business" in Nueces County at orprior to the
time of the venue hearing, and, therefore, sustained the defendant's plea of
privilege. 156
Unconscionable Actions and Implied Warranty Actions. Texas courts de-
cided a number of consumer cases during the survey period involving un-
conscionable actions violative of section 17.45(5) of the DTPA,157 and
actions for breach of implied warranties under section 17.50A(a)(2). 158
Cheney v. Parks159 and Thornton Homes, Inc. v. Greiner160 involved com-
plaints alleging breach of implied warranties in the sale of used goods. In
Cheney the plaintiffs contended that the house they purchased failed to
meet the standards of habitability that a reasonable buyer would expect
and, therefore, constituted a breach of an implied warranty of habitability.
The defendant answered that the jury's finding that the house failed to
meet the standard of habitability was a finding of a partial failure of con-
sideration, not a finding of a deceptive trade practice. The court agreed,
noting that the plaintiffs first amended petition did not allege an implied
warranty and the record failed to indicate that the issue was tried by con-
sent.' 61 The court stated that since the DTPA did not create an implied
warranty, "[a]ny warranty enforceable thereunder must be created inde-
pendently of the act."' 62 Noting that under Texas law, however, no im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose existed for used goods,
the court held that plaintiffs had failed to prove a cause of action under the
Act.' 63 In Thornton Homes, the Eastland court of civil appeals reiterated
153. Id. at 360.
154. 605 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
155. Id. at 734; see Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
156. 605 S.W.2d at 735. After the 1979 amendments to the DTPA, venue is proper where
the defendant solicits business.
157. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
158. Id. § 17.50A(a)(2).
159. 605 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. 619 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ).
161. 605 S.W.2d at 642.
162. Id.; see Bunting v. Fodor, 586 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.)
1979, no writ).
163. 605 S.W.2d at 642; see Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
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the general rule of Texas law of no implied warranty for used goods, but
apparently conditioned the unavailability of the implied warranty upon
the fact that the purchaser had knowledge of the used condition of the
goods. 164
In Chrysler Corp. v. Schuenemann the court of civil appeals sustained a
judgement against the defendant for violations of the DTPA arising out of
the plaintiffs purchase of a new motor home.1 65 The plaintiffs had alledg-
ed that the defendant dealer violated certain express and implied warran-
ties and misrepresented the characteristics or uses of the purchased vehicle.
Immediately after acquisition of the vehicle, the plaintiffs developed
problems necessitating eleven separate trips to the dealer. On appeal the
defendant alleged that it had discharged its obligations under its express
written limited warranty and therefore could not have violated the implied
warranty contained in the DTPA. The court cited section 17.50(a)(2) of
the Act, which allowed a consumer to maintain an action if he has been
adversely affected by a breach of an express or implied warranty. 166 The
court held Chrysler liable for its failure to discharge all of its obligations
under both its express limited warranty and the implied warranties of
fitness and suitability for the ordinary purpose for which the vehicle was
sold. 167
In Providence Hospital v. Truly168 the plaintiff was a patient at the de-
fendant hospital and filed an action for negligence and violation of the
DTPA after a contaminated drug was injected into her eye during the final
act of cataract surgery. The hospital alleged that the furnishing of the drug
during surgery constituted a "medical service" for which its liability was
limited and/or excluded pursuant to the terms of the contract executed by
the plaintiff, and was therefore not a "sale" governed by the Act. The
court determined, however, that the exclusions from section 2.315 of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code on implied warranties for fitness of
goods sold for a particular purpose were limited to the furnishing of
human blood, blood plasma, or other human tissues or organs from a
blood bank or reservoir of other such tissues or organs. 169 Finding that
providing the contaminated drug to the patient was not a "medical serv-
ice" excluded from the warranty imposed by section 2.315, the court deter-
mined that the hospital was liable for treble damages under the DTPA. 170
A particularly troubling decision was rendered in Norwood Builders, Inc.
v. Toler.17' The plaintiffs brought an action for damages sustained as a
result of alleged defects in the construction of a new home. The court
164. 619 S.W.2d at 9.
165. 618 S.W.2d 799, 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, writ reed n.r.e.).
166. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (emphasis
added).
167. 618 S.W.2d at 804.
168. 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd).
169. Id. at 133; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(e) (Vernon 1971).
170. 611 S.W.2d at 133.
171. 609 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
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determined that the plaintiffs' purchase involved the sale of a "good" enti-
tling them to relief under the DTPA. 72 Not content to stop there, how-
ever, the court found that an officer of the company in his individual
capacity had held himself out as an owner of the defendant corporation,
made warranties to the consumers regarding the home's characteristics,
and facilitated the plaintiffs procurement of a loan to finance the purchase
of the home from the defendant corporation. 173 The individual officer,
therefore, was held to be personally liable for damages under the
DTPA. 174
The court of civil appeals rendered another troubling opinion in
DeBakey v. Slaggs, in which the court affirmed the trial court's judgment
rendering the plaintiff's attorney liable for damages under the DTPA.175
In DeBakey the defendant was hired to change the name of the plaintiff's
daughter. A retainer fee of $120 was paid by the plaintiffs against an
agreed total fee of $250 for the services. Because of numerous defects and
insufficiencies in the handling of the matter, the order changing the name
of the minor was never signed, and the plaintiffs resorted to other counsel
at a cost of $300 to complete the proceeding. The court determined that
the defendant was guilty of an unconscionable act and trebled the plain-
tiff's actual damages of $170 in addition to awarding $1,000 as reasonable
attorney's fees. 176
Damages. In Duncan v. Luke Johnson Ford, Inc. the Texas Supreme Court
determined that damages could not be awarded under the DTPA for
mental anguish alone, absent any proof of a willful tort, gross negligence,
willful disregard, or mental anguish causing physical injury. 177 In revers-
ing the judgment of the lower courts, the court determined that the defend-
ant was guilty of a deceptive trade practice in representing to the plaintiff
that the van purchased had an eight-cylinder engine when in fact it had a
six-cylinder engine. 178 The court, however, reversed the lower courts' de-
termination that the plaintiff was entitled to $150 in actual damages,
$3,500 in reasonable attorney's fees, and $2,000 for mental anguish, and
instead awarded only the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff plus his
attorney's fees of $3,500.179
A contractor brought an action against a homeowner to recover the bal-
ance due on a cost-plus-fee contract and, in the alternative, on the theory
of quantum meruit in Beeman v. Worrell.80 The homeowner filed a treble
172. Id. at 862.
173. Id. at 863.
174. Id.
175. 605 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980), writ re/dn.r.e. per
curiam, 612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1981).
176. 605 S.W.2d at 633.
177. 603 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. 1980). See also Webster College v. Speier, 605 S.W.2d
712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980), afd, 616 S.W.2d 617 (rex. 1981).
178. 603 S.W.2d at 778.
179. Id. at 779.
180. 612 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
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damages counterclaim for violation of the DTPA. The court determined
that the contractor had breached its express warranty of "fine quality con-
struction," and that the breach was a producing cause of the defendant's
damages in the amount of $20,500. 181 The $20,500 was applied against the
amount of money that the jury found the contractor to be entitled to on his
action for breach of contract and/or quantum meruit, and a judgment in
favor of the contractor for the net sum of $37,500, plus agreed attorney's
fees of $3,000 was then rendered.182
The defendant homeowner claimed that the jury's finding of a breach of
express warranty entitled him to treble his damages of $20,500 and thus
recover the difference between his trebled damages and the amount to
which the jury found the contractor to be entitled to for part performance
of the contract. The court ruled, however, that a party may only treble its
net recovery under the DTPA.18 3 Because the damages awarded defend-
ant for his counterclaim were less than the amount awarded the plaintiff,
defendant had no net recovery that could have been trebled; therefore, the
defendant was not entitled to a recovery.
In Brunstetter v. Southern 184 the plaintiff sued the listing real estate bro-
ker for treble damages. At trial proof was adduced that prior to filing the
lawsuit the plaintiff had settled with the vendor of the property and the
cooperating real estate broker for an amount in excess of three times the
actual damages he suffered. Based upon these facts, the court denied the
plaintiffs claim against the listing real estate broker and awarded the de-
fendant its reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending the action,
finding that the action had been brought in bad faith and for the purpose
of harassment. 8 5
Statute of Limitations. In Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Castillo 186 the court,
in a case of first impression, applied the "discovery rule" to the DTPA.
Under this rule the limitations period begins to run when the act com-
plained of is discovered.' 87 The court initially had to determine whether
181. Id. at 955.
182. Id. at 955-56.
183. Id. at 959.
184. 619 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
185. Id. at 559-60. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
186. 616 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
187. See Quinn v. Press, 137 Tex. 60, 140 S.W.2d 438 (1941) (limitations period begins to
run when fraud is or should have been discovered). In 1979 the Texas Legislature added to
the DTPA § 17.56A, which governs the limitation period question from the effective date of
August 27, 1979. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56A (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
All actions brought under this subchapter must be commenced within two
years after the date on which the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice
occurred or within two years after the consumer discovered or in in the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the occurrence of the false,
misleading, or deceptive act or practice. The period of limitation provided in
this section may be extended for a period of 180 days if the plaintiff proves
that failure timely to commence the action was caused by the defendant's
knowingly engaging in conduct solely calculated to induce the plaintiff to re-
frain from or postpone the commencement of the action.
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the representations by the defendant were of themselves unlawful. The
court stated that if the actions themselves were not unlawful, then the
cause of action arising from the actions did not accrue until the damages
were sustained. I8 8 Determining that the representation made by the de-
fendant that the construction was to be in a good and workmanlike man-
ner was not per se unlawful, the court therefore found that the statement
only became actionable when the damage occurred. 189 Consequently, the
statute of limitations did not commence to run until the plaintiff discov-
ered the actionable conduct. 190
III. USURY
4. Legislation
Two significant pieces of legislation bearing on the question of usury
were enacted since the prior Creditor and Consumer Rights Article in the
Annual Survey. At the state level a new usury act, 19 1 was signed into law
on May 8, 1981. The act responds to the need for usury legislation that
accounts for and reacts to market forces. Unfortunately, many of its per-
plexing and confusing provisions negate much of the responsiveness it
would otherwise have. On the federal level, the passage of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980192 preempts
much of the state usury regulation and thus affects a broad spectrum of the
lending activities of Texas lenders.
Texas Legislation. The general concept behind the new Texas usury act is
to allow alternative interest ceilings depending upon the type of loan, its
purpose, and the amount of money involved.193 The provisions of the act
are not compulsory, and consequently, the lender uncertain of the effect of
the new law can avoid problems of interpretation by safely charging inter-
est below the minimum ceiling. A determination of the type of loan in-
volved is crucial to an understanding and correct application of the Act.
All loan transactions fall into one of four alternative categories that are
subject to different interest rate ceilings and other limitations. In each in-
stance, the proposed transaction must be identified as either (1) an open-
end variable account; (2) an open-end fixed account; (3) a closed-end vari-
able account; or (4) a closed-end fixed account. A lender's failure to iden-
tify correctly the appropriate loan classification for the particular
188. 616 S.W.2d at 633.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01, -1.04, -1.07(0, -1.08,-2.07, -2.08,-
3.01(3), -3.15(a), -3.16, -3.21, -4.01(8), -5.02(6), -6.02(15), -6.03(5), -6.05, -7.03
(Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981). In addition TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-6A.01
to -6A. 17 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-198 1) of the Credit Code was enacted, thereby bring-
ing credit transactions for manufactured homes under this chapter rather than chapters 6
and 7 of the Consumer Credit Code. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
192. Depository Institutions Deregeulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
193. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
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transaction could result in a violation of the interest rate ceiling. Unfortu-
nately for lenders, the definitions for these four alternative accounts are
vague or nonexistent. 94
Under the revised article 5069-1.04(b) one of three fixed interest rate
ceilings will govern Texas loan transactions. These ceilings impose an ab-
solute standard within which contractually agreed upon interest rate com-
putations, changing as often as weekly, must fall or face restriction. A
minimum ceiling of 18% per annum exists regardless of loan purpose or
amount. 195 This minimum may be exceeded when other provisions under
the Texas usury laws are met.196 A maximum ceiling of 24% per annum
may be reached when a loan is made for personal, family, household, or
agricultural use, or business loans for $250,000 or less. 197 The maximum
rate may rise to 28% per annum if a loan exceeds $250,000 and is made for
business, commercial, investment or similar purposes. 98 Thus, loans
made for personal, family, household, or agricultural use have a maximum
ceiling of 24% per annum regardless of loan amount.
These usury ceilings are then juxtaposed against a complex alternative
interest rate ceiling structure. Four alternative rate formulas exist, includ-
ing the "indicated rate ceiling"' 199 (or weekly computed rate), "monthly
ceiling, '' 2°° "quarterly ceiling," 201 and "annualized ceiling. ' 20 2 These for-
194. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(f) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981) as
amended defines open-end accounts as "any account, under a written contract under which
a creditor may permit the obligor to make purchases or borrow money from time to time,
and under which interest or time price differential may from time to time be computed on an
outstanding unpaid balance." The term "variable account" is not defined either by previ-
ously enacted usury laws or by the Act. Nor can one look to a definition of "fixed rate
account" as a guide because no such definition is provided, but the Act laboriously defines
"variable rate account" by implication as follows:
The parties to any contract, including a contract for an open-end account, may
agree to and stipulate for a rate or amount by contracting for any index,
formula, or provision of law, by or under which the numerical rate or amount
can from time to time be determined. However, the rate or amount so pro-
duced may not exceed the ceiling that may from time to time be in effect and
applicable to the contract, for so long as debt is outstanding under the con-
tract. Provided, further, that variable contract rates as described in this Sec-
tion (f) are not allowed in a contract in which the interest or time price
differential is precomputed and added into the amount of the contract at the
time of the contract.
Id. art. 5069-1.04(0. One must assume that in the absence of a definition for "fixed rate
account," it is that which is not a "variable rate account."
195. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04(b)(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
196. Id. art. 5069-1.04(b)(1), (2).
197. Id. art. 5069-1.04(b)(2).
198. Id.
199. Id. art. 5069-1.04(a)(1). The "indicated rate ceiling" is arrived at by computing,
for the week prior to the week the interest rate is contracted for, the auction average rate
quoted on a bank discount basis for 26-week treasury bills issued by the United States Gov-
ernment, as published by the Federal Reserve Board, multiplied by two and rounded to the
nearest one-quarter of one percent (1/4%). A computation of the various rates applicable
under the Act is compiled weekly by the Texas Consumer Credit Commissioner.
200. Id. art. 5069-1.04(c). The monthly ceiling is computed by taking the average of
indicated rate ceilings for the month preceding the transaction. This monthly ceiling is com-
puted by the consumer credit commissioner on the first business day of the calendar month.
201. Id. arts. 5069-1.04(a)(2), -1.04(d). The quarterly ceiling is arrived at by the con-
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mulas may be utilized in most instances for any lending transaction memo-
rialized by written contract. 20 3 Regardless of the interest ultimately
computed under the alternative rate formulas, the rates actually contracted
for, charged, or collected may not exceed the appropriate ceiling allowed
by sections 1.04(b)(1) and (b)(2). Thus, under this interest rate structure
computations of the alternative rates will entitle lenders to charge the al-
ternative rate chosen so long as it does not exceed the applicable maximum
ceilings of 24% and 28%. Should the lender's interest yield a rate that is
less than the minimum statutory rate of 18%, the lender, if the agreement
so provides, will be entitled to charge interest up to 18% per annum.
In addition to this complex rate structure, the Act prescribes when each
alternative ceiling may be utilized. Fixed-rate closed-end loans may use
the indicated rate and quarterly ceilings, 2°4 and fixed-rate open-end loans
may use the indicated rate ceiling, quarterly ceiling, or annualized ceil-
ing.20 5 Variable-rate closed-end loans for purposes other than personal,
family, or household use may utilize the indicated rate ceiling, monthly
ceiling, or quarterly ceiling.206 If personal, family, or household purposes
are involved, the monthly ceiling may not be used.207 A variable-rate
open-end loan may use any of the alternative ceilings except when the
loan's purpose is for personal, family, or household use, in which case the
monthly ceiling is excluded as an option.208 For closed-end fixed-rate
loans the existing rate at the date of contract will prevail for the life of the
loan, and will not change as interest rates otherwise change. In contrast,
new variable-rate open-end loans and fixed-rate open-end loans are sub-
ject to interest fluctuations for charges made during the most recent rate
adjustment period.209 Clearly, all variable rate loans are subject to the
floating interest ceiling.
Besides the attendant problems with correct use of the various types of
loans and their application to the alternative rates, other significant ques-
tions remain concerning the implementation of these amendments to the
usury laws.210 Also, the constitutionality of the retroactive application of
sumer credit commissioner by averaging the indicated rate ceiling for the previous three
calendar months.
202. Id. The annualized ceiling is computed by averaging the indicated rate ceiling for
the previous twelve months. The computation, made by the consumer credit commissioner
on December 1, March 1, June 1, and September 1, is effective for the three-month period
after January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, respectively.
203. Id. arts. 5069-1.04(a), (c), (e).
204. Id. arts. 5069-1.04(a)(1), (a)(2), (c), (h).
205. Id. arts. 5069-1.04(a), (c), (e).
206. Id..
207. Id. arts. 5069-1.04(a), (c), (e), (h).
208. Id. arts. 5069-1.04(h)(1).
209. See note 194 supra.
210. Section 27 of the Act amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon
Pam. Supp. 1971-1981) provides that:
This Act shall be applicable to all claims of forfeiture made after the effective
date of this Act but, with respect to claims of forfeiture in litigation pending at
such effective date, the amount forfeited shall be determined under the provi-
sions of law as it existed prior to the effective date of this Act.
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the Act is still open to debate.21' The judicially accepted and legislatively
enacted concept of "spreading" was not abrogated by the Act. Under this
doctrine courts determine the usurious nature of an extended loan by
spreading the full amount of interest charged over the entire term of the
note.212 The doctrine's application in the context of the new alternative
rate structure is open to question, however, in view of the language of arti-
cle 5069-1.04(c), which now states:
In contracts for which the monthly ceiling is available under this sec-
tion, if the parties agree that the rate is subject to being adjusted on a
monthly basis in accordance with Section (f) of this Article they may
further contract that the rate from time to time in effect may not ex-
ceed the monthly ceiling from time to time in effect under this section
and the monthly ceiling from time to time in effect is the ceiling on
those contracts, instead of any ceiling under Article 1.04(a) of this
Title.213
Additionally, article 5069-1.04(f) now provides:
The parties to any contract, including a contract for an open-end ac-
count, may agree to and stipulate for a rate or amount by contracting
for any index, formula, or provision of law, by or under which the
numerical rate or amount can from time to time be determined. How-
ever, the rate or amount so produced may not exceed the ceiling that
may from time to time be in effect and applicable to the contract, for
so long as debt is outstanding under the contract. Provided, further,
that variable contract rates as described in this Section 09 are not al-
lowed in a contract in which the interest or time price differential is
precomputed and added into the amount of the contract at the time of the
contract .214
The better interpretation is that "spreading" as authorized by Texas courts
is still good law.
1981 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, § 27, at 286.
Article 5069-1A.01 entitled "Conversion of open-end accounts" provides:
Any creditor electing to implement the provisions of Article 1.04 of this Title,
as amended, to an open-end account existing on the effective date of this Act
and not previously subject to Article 1.04, as amended, must allow the obligor
to pay the balance then existing at the rate previously agreed to and at the
minimum payment terms previously agreed to. For this purpose, payments on
an account may be applied by the creditor to the balance existing on the ac-
count on the effective date of this Act prior to applying same to credit ex-
tended after the effective date of this Act.
TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1A.01 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
211. By inference this amendment permits its retroactive application to open-end ac-
counts entered into prior to the effective date of the Act. Furthermore, article 5069-1.04(e)
states that the maximum rate on renewals or extensions is the applicable ceiling for new
contracts entered into at the time of the renewal or extension. In view of this apparent
legislative intent to apply the provisions of the Act retroactively, it is necessary in each case
to determine if the contract for which an adjustment is contemplated provides for a change
in the interest rate. Clearly, an adjustment upward would not be appropriate in a fixed-rate
closed-end account entered into prior to May 8, 1981. As for other accounts, whether the
upward adjustment is permissible will likely be determined through contract interpretation.
212. See Tanner Dev. Co. V. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977); Nevels v. Harris,
129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1936).
213. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04(c) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1980).
214. Id. art. 5069-1.04(f) (emphasis added).
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Lenders will have to await further authority as to the application of
many of the usury provisions in the Act. In particular, the bill places great
significance on words, terms, and phrases not always clearly defined or
explained. 215 Although article 5069-1.04(b)(2) now permits interest rates
up to 28% if a business loan over $250,000 is involved, it does not disclose
whether the dollar limit can be exceeded in a series of loan advances, nor
does it offer guidance as to the relevant characteristics necessary for find-
ing a loan to be a "business" loan.
Federal Legislation. Of no small consequence to lenders in Texas was the
passage of the federal Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (DIDA).216 Section 501 of DIDA preempts state
usury ceilings on first lien residential mortages made by federally con-
nected lending institutions.217 The breadth of its coverage extends to inter-
est rates, points and finance charges that are charged, taken, received, or
reserved on either loans, mortgages, credit sales, or advances secured by
first liens on residential real property,218 first liens on stock in residential
cooperative housing corporations where financing is purchase money,
219
and certain first liens on manufactured residential housing.220 The pre-
emptive effect of DIDA can be overridden upon affirmative state action,
within three years.221
Further preemption of Texas usury laws occurred under section 511 of
DIDA.222 State usury ceilings applicable to business and agricultural
loans over $25,000 after March 30, 1980, were preempted by that section as
to any lender, provided that the rate charged is not more than five percent
in excess of the discount rate, including any surcharge thereon, on ninety-
day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal
215. See, e.g., id. art. 5069-1.04(j), which now states:
If a creditor implements an annualized or quarterly ceiling as to a majority of
its open-end accounts that are under a particular plan or arrangement and are
for obligors in this state, the ceiling is also the ceiling for all open-end ac-
counts that are opened or activated under that plan for obligors in this state
during the period that the election is in effect.
What constitutes a "particular plan or arrangement" for purposes of article 5069-1.040) is
not clear.
216. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See
also Samuels, Usury Preemption.- The Federal/State Scheme, 98 BANKING L.J. 892 (1981);
Weaver & O'Malley, The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980. An Overview, 98 BANKING L.J. 100 (1981).
217. A federally connected lending institution is one that is either a federally chartered
bank, credit union, or savings and loan association; or nonfederally chartered lenders whose
accounts are insured by FSLIC, FDIC, and NCUA; or a member of the Federal Reserve
System or the Federal Home Loan Bank System; or a lender participating in a mortgage
insurance program supervised by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. De-
ository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221,
501(a)(2)(A), 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
218. Id. §§ 501(a)(1), (a)(1)(A).
219. Id. § 501(a)(1)(A).
220. Id. §§ 501(a)(1)(A), (c), (d).
221. Id. § 501(b)(2). For regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board interpreting § 501, see 12 C.F.R. § 590 (1981).
222. 12 U.S.C. § 86a (Supp. IV 1980).
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Reserve district where the lender is located.223 This preemption continues
until April 1, 1983, subject to a state override provision.224 Since October
8, 1980, the qualifying loan need only exceed $1,000 rather than the
$25,000 threshold originally enacted. 225
With respect to business and agricultural loans, a loan is made if it ex-
ceeds the applicable limit in its original principal sum, or under a series of
advances made in whole or in part during the period, the total sum of
which exceeds the applicable amount. 226 Similarly, the loan exceeds the
applicable limit if it was made during the period for return of interest at a
variable rate or if it arose out of an agreed modification, renewal, or exten-
sion of credit. 227 The lender who knowingly takes, reserves, or charges an
interest rate in excess of that allowed under section 511, forfeits interest
under the loan.228 When the interest has actually been paid by the bor-
rower, the section provides a refund of twice the interest paid.229
Section 521 of DIDA230 permits numerous lending institutions other
than national banks231 to charge interest of one percent over the Federal
Reserve discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper currently in effect
at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where the de-
pository is located.232 This provision became effective on April 1, 1980,
and it remains in effect permanently unless Texas opts out.
B. Case Law
Cases Defining "'Interest. " During the survey period three cases addressed
the issue of the proper definition of interest. In O'Connor v. Lamb233 the
defendant borrowed $2,500 from his own bank and loaned that same
amount to a third party, the principal to be repaid within ninety days plus
an additional sum of $500. In defending the usury suit brought by the
third-party borrower, the defendant claimed that the additional $500 con-
stituted a service charge for his initial procurement of the loan. Noting
that the defendant did not endorse the loan from the bank to the third
party, nor act as surety or guarantor, the court concluded that the defend-
ant's act of borrowing money to loan to another did not entitle him to
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-339, §§ 324(c),
(d), 94 Stat. 1614.
226. Id. § 324(c)(1)(B).
227. Id.
228. 12 U.S.C. § 86a (Supp. IV 1980).
229. Id. The statute of limitations is two years from the date of usurious payment.
230. 12 U.S.C. § 183 1d (Supp. IV 1980).
231. Section 521 applies to state chartered insured banks, insured savings banks, insured
mutual savings banks, insured branches of foreign banks, federal and state chartered insured
savings and loan associations, federal and state insured credit unions, and small business
investment companies. 12 U.S.C. § 183ld(a) (Supp. IV 1980). National banks have the
option to charge interest at the rate permitted under section 521 pursuant to section 85 of the
ational Bank Act of 1864, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976).
232. Id.
233. 593 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
[Vol. 36
CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
charge a fee or a commission. 234 The $500 charged, therefore, was consid-
ered interest and the loan was held to be usurious.235
In contrast, the court in Apparel Manufacturing Co. v. Vantage Properties,
Inc. found that no interest had been charged although the plaintiff-lessee
was charged a "late fee" by the defendant-lessor for delinquent rent.236
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the late charge, in excess of
ten percent, was governed by the usury statutes, holding that a lease or
rental transaction does not fall within the purview of the usury statutes. 237
Finally, a "retail installment contract" was reviewed in San Juan Pools,
Inc. v. Krohn and found by the court to be mechanically deficient to such
an extent that its legality was governed by chapter 1 of the Credit Code
instead of chapter 6.238 Under chapter 6 the seller must comply with rigor-
ous disclosure requirements, however, and the court in San Juan Pools
found that the seller's failure to do so brought the transaction within the
purview of chapter 1. As a result the obligor was entitled to twice the
amount of interest contracted for plus reasonable attorney's fees.239 The
contract in San Juan Pools failed to satisfy so many of the requirements of
chapter 6 that the decision, while correct, does not present a significant
refinement of the law.
Cases Determining Whether Interest Had Been "Contracted For, Charged or
Received " Texas courts decided several cases during the survey period
interpreting controversial article 5069-1.06.240 In Tyra v. Bob Carroll
234. Id. at 387.
235. Id.
236. 597 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
237. Id. at 449.
238. 594 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
239. Id. at 494. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.02, 6.01(e) (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1971-1981).
240. Article 5069-1.06 was amended by the Texas Legislature in 1979. August 27, 1979,
was the effective date of the amendment. The current version of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971 & Pam. Supp. 1971-1981) now provides:
(1) Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is
greater than the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor
three times the amount of usurious interest contracted for, charged or re-
ceived, such usurious interest being the amount the total interest contracted
for, charged, or received exceeds the amount of interest allowed by law, and
reasonable attorney fees fixed by the court except that in no event shall the
amount forfeited be less than Two Thousand Dollars or twenty percent of the
principal, whichever is the smaller sum; provided, that there shall be no pen-
alty for any usurious interest which results from an accidental and bona fide
error.
(2) Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is in
excess of double the amount of interest allowed by this Subtitle shall forfeit as
an additional penalty, all principal as well as interest and all other charges and
shall pay reasonable attorney fees set by the court; provided further that any
such person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by fine of not more
than One Thousand Dollars. Each contract or transaction in violation of this
section shall constitute a separate offense punishable hereunder.
(3) All such actions brought under this Article shall be brought in any
court of this State having jurisdiction thereof within four years from the date
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Construction Co. 241 the creditor's attorney nearly caused penalties to be
assessed against his client when he sued for interest not provided for in the
documents creating the claim. Upon the defendant's failure to pay an un-
disputed amount owing for services rendered on a construction contract,
demand letters were sent to the defendant, but ignored. The demand let-
ters neither provided for nor demanded interest. Suit thereafter was filed
for the amount owing on the account plus interest at one and one-half
percent per month computed from the due date on the accounts. The de-
fendant, noting that no agreement had ever been made as to interest on the
accounts, asserted that by charging interest in excess of double the amount
allowed by law under article 5069, the plaintiff had subjected himself to
the penalties provided in article 5069-1.06(1) and (2), including three
times the amount of the usurious interest charged, reasonable attorney's
fees, and forfeiture of the debt. 242 The plaintiffs attorney asserted an "ac-
cidental and bona fide error" and amended his petition to delete the claim
for interest and further denied that the creditor had ever claimed any inter-
est on the accounts. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's determi-
nation that the weight of the evidence supported a finding that no interest
had been charged, being swayed by the fact that eight invoices were sent
without any charge for interest, the accounts receivable ledger reflected no
charge for interest, and two demand letters were sent that made no claim
for interest.2 43
In Nationwide Financial Corp. v. English,244 a troubling case for credi-
tors' attorneys, the plaintiff initiated suit against the defendant for viola-
tion of numerous Credit Code provisions. The defendant responded by
alleging default, accelerating the payments due under the time price differ-
ential contract, and demanding the entire unpaid balance including
unearned time price differential. The plaintiff thereafter amended his peti-
tion to allege that by the counterclaim the defendant had charged in excess
of twice the time price differential permitted by law.245 The defendant,
realizing its mistake, amended its counterclaim to exclude any prayer for
the unearned time price differential. The trial court held that the defend-
when the usurious charge was received or collected in the county of the de-
fendant's residence, or in the county where the interest in excess of the amount
authorized by this Subtitle has been received or collected, or where such trans-
action had been entered into or where the parties who paid the interest in
excess of the amount authorized by this Subtitle resided when such transaction
occurred, or where he resides.
241. 618 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
242. Id. at 854. See also Houston Sash & Door, Inc. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.
1979) (charging of interest on open account during specified interest-free period held to
constitute interest in excess of double the allowed rate, thereby subjecting the creditor to the
penalties).
243. 618 S.W.2d at 856. See Mecey v. Seggern, 596 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1980, no writ).
244. 604 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ granted).
245. The plaintiff pleaded that he was entitled to a recovery of twice the time price differ-
ential and default charges as permitted by TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(a)
(Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981), and to a forfeiture of the entire principal and all other
charges as permitted by art. 5069-8.02. 604 S.W.2d at 459.
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ant's counterclaim constituted "charging" of interest notwithstanding its
amendment to the counterclaim. Although reversing on other grounds, the
appellate court agreed that the defendant's counterclaim constituted the
"charging" of interest, and noted that:
If a creditor is to be allowed to reduce the amount that he sues for
after a usury claim has been asserted against him, then the penalty
provided by the statute would be totally ineffective, since any viola-
tion and penalties could be erased simply by reduction of the amount
sued for.
246
Tyra and Nationwide can be reconciled, but unfortunately they do not es-
tablish a definitive rule as to when a pleading does or does not constitute
"charging."
Three cases dealing with "charging" that deserve mention are Dixon v.
Brooks,247 Woolard v. Texas Motors, Inc. ,248 and Smart v. Tower Land &
Investment Co. 249 Dixon serves as a stern warning to the growing number
of private obligees engendered by the creative financing wave. The obligee
in Dixon assessed a "late charge" in excess of ten percent per annum
against her defaulting obligor. The obligee argued that the "late charge"
was in the nature of a service charge and not "interest." The court rejected
this argument and noted that except for certain statutory provisions that
permit savings and loan associations to charge penalties for late pay-
ments,250 late charges were always interest within the meaning of the usury
statutes.251
The court in Woolard addressed the recurring issue of whether or not a
contract "hypothetically" charges interest. 252 The purchaser in Woolard
contended that the contract was usurious on its face because it provided:
"Time is of the essence of this contract. In the event Buyer defaults in
any payment, or fails to obtain or maintain the insurance required
hereunder, or fails to comply with any other provision hereof, or
Seller in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or perform-
ance hereunder is impaired, Seller shall have the right to declare all
amounts due or to become due hereunder to be immediately due and
payable .... ,"253
The purchaser argued that under hypothetical circumstances an accelera-
tion early into the payoff period would, in view of the above provision,
result in the holder having an immediate right to the entire amount of
246. 604 S.W.2d at 461.
247. 604 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ reftd n.r.e.).
248. 616 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
249. 597 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1980).
250. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 507 (Vernon 1964).
251. 604 S.W.2d at 334.
252. See Smart v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 597 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1980); Walker v. Tem-
ple Trust Co., 124 Tex. 575, 80 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Con-
tractors & Supply, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
Triton Oil was reported in the advance sheets but withdrawn from the bound volume of the
reporter at the court's request.
253. 616 S.W.2d at 707 (emphasis by the court). The statutory basis for the plaintiffs
action was TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069--7.03 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
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interest due on the note, unearned as well as earned, and would result in
an interest charge over twice the amount allowed by law. The court recog-
nized the potential for such an abuse, but chose to interpret the contract as
a whole and concluded that the parties never intended for the lender to
retain unearned interest.254 The court noted that a claimant must not only
prove that a hypothetical construction supports a claim of usury, but must
also overcome the presumption that the collection of usurious interest was
not intended.255
In Smart v. Tower Land & Investment Co., a case similar to Woolard, the
Texas Supreme Court held that prepaid interest can be usurious upon ac-
celeration when there is an affirmative indication that the prepaid interest
is to be retained by the lender.256 In contrast to the situation existing in
Woolard, the contractual provision in Smart not only could be interpreted
on the whole as providing for usurious rates, but it also provided for reten-
tion of all prepaid interest in the event of acceleration even though some of
the retained interest would be unearned.257 Under these circumstances,
the court logically found that the defendant had "contracted for" usurious
interest.258 As in Woolard, however, no interest was actually received. 259
Of note during the survey period were two cases which interpreted
whether or not terms printed on an invoice constituted a written contract
for purposes of article 5069-1.03. In El Paso Environmental Systems, Inc.
v. Filtronics, Inc. 260 the court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to utilize sec-
tion 2.207 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code as a statutory basis
for creating a "written contract." Section 2.207 provides that under certain
254. 616 S.W.2d at 708. The court cited with approval Walker v. Temple Trust Co., 124
Tex. 575, 577, 80 S.W.2d 935, 936-37 (1935), which stated: "The determination of whether
or not usury exists in a contract is a matter involving first and pre-eminently the principle
which is the polestar of construction, to wit: the ascertainment of the dominant purpose and
intention of the parties embodied in the contract, interpreted as a whole. 616 S.W.2d
at 707.
255. 616 S.W.2d at 709. See also Ware v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 604 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
256. 597 S.W.2d 333, 340-41 (Tex. 1980).
257. Two provisions in the note proved to be the defendant's undoing. The first gave it
the option upon default to accelerate the note by providing:
Default in the payment of any part of the principal or interest when due, or
failure to comply with any of the agreements and conditions in the instrument
given to secure this note shall, at the option of the holder hereof, mature this
note and it shall at once become due and payable. . .however, holder shall
give maker or endorsers thirty (30) days' notice of default before this note can
be matured.
The note further stated that "[t]he maker hereof is not now nor shall he ever
be personally liable on this note, but the payees or other holders of this note
shall never be obligated to refund any payment of interest or principal after
such payment has been made."
Id. at 339-40.
258. See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977); Shropshire v. Com-
merce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), on motion for rehearing, 120
Tex. 400, 39 S.W.2d 11, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931). See also Walker v. Temple Trust
Co., 124 Tex. 575, 80 S.W.2d 935 (1935).
259. See Hagar v. Williams, 593 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarllo 1979, no writ)
(considered whether interest was actually received).
260. 609 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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circumstances additions to an original contract between merchants become
a part of the contract, unless within a reasonable time the recipient of the
proposal objects.261 The court in El Paso recognized the presence of con-
ditions sufficient to find a written contract under section 2.207, but held
that for purposes of article 5069-1.03, no "written contract ascertaining
the sum payable" had been created.262 Consequently, the defendant's
charging of interest from and after the time when the sum was due and
payable constituted a violation of article 5069-1.03.263 A different con-
clusion, however, was reached in Dean Vivian Homes, Inc. v. Sebera's
Plumbing & Appliances, Inc., in which the court held that invoices signed
by the party to be charged created a written contract for purposes of article
5069-1.03.264
Four cases during the survey period dealt with the question of standing
to plead the usury claim or defense. In Vordenbaum v. Rubin the court
concluded that the usurer did not have standing to set up his own usury to
avoid his obligation under an agreement that turned sour.265 The court in
Vordenbaum noted that the usury law did not render a usurious contract
fully void but rather prescribed penalties despite the contract's enforceabil-
261. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207 (Vernon 1971).
262. 609 S.W.2d at 812.
263. At the time the events under which this cause of action arose, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-1.03 provided:
When no specific rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties, interest at the
rate of six percent per annum shall be allowed on all written contracts ascer-
taining the sum payable, from and after the time when the sum is due and
payable; and on all open accounts, from the first day of January after the same
are made.
Article 5069-1.03 has since been amended by 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 707, § 1 at 1718,
and now provides that "[wihen no specified rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties,
interest at the rate of six percent per annum shall be allowed on all accounts and contracts
ascertaining the sum payable, commencing on the thirtieth (30th) day from and after the
time when the sum is due and payable." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03
(Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
264. 615 S.W.2d 921, 925-26. (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ). Clearly, because
the debtor signed the invoices, the fact situation was substantially different from that posed
in El Paso. Furthermore, a legend in bold face type on each invoice informed the buyer:
NOTICE TO THE BUYER: DO NOT SIGN THIS CONTRACT
BEFORE YOU READ IT OR IF IT CONTAINS BLANK SPACES. YOU
ARE ENTITLED TO A COPY OF THE CONTRACT YOU SIGN.
UNDER THE LAW YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO PAY OFF IN AD-
VANCE THE FULL AMOUNT DUE AND UNDER CERTAIN CONDI-
TIONS MAY OBTAIN A PARTIAL REFUND OF THE FINANCE
CHARGE. KEEP THIS CONTRACT TO PROTECT YOUR LEGAL
RIGHTS.
BUYER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THIS CONTRACT WAS COM-
PLETELY FILLED IN PRIOR TO ITS EXECUTION AND THAT HE RE-
CEIVED A TRUE COPY THEREOF.
Id. at 925.
265. 611 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). An interesting
point was raised when the court commented on the sellers' stated desire to avoid a usurious
transaction by having the court rule the agreement unenforceable. The court noted that the
sellers sought to avoid their obligations under the contract because of usury, but made no
effort to reform the note so that it would bear a lawful rate of interest. The question be-
comes, then, whether a buyer at a later date can sue a seller for collecting usury when or-
dered by the court to perform the contract. Id.
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ity. Consequently, the court granted the buyer's request for specific per-
formance despite the clearly usurious nature of the agreement.266 In
Patterson v. Neel the court concluded that the usury statutes were written
for the protection of obligors on notes and consequently guarantors were
not allowed to raise the claim of usury even though liable for payment
under the guaranty contract. 267 The same court similarly concluded in
RJ Carter Enterprises, Inc. v. Greenway Bank & Trust that a guarantor
could not raise the defense of usury with respect to a corporate debt even
though various terms of the document referred to the guarantor, an indi-
vidual, as the "borrower. ' 268 The court noted that the parties intended the
obligation to be that of the corporation and evidence of any other intention
was inconclusive.269 Lastly, in South Eastern Xpress, Inc. v. Bank of Crow-
ley the court rejected the attempt by an obligor's assignee to assert the
obligor's claim of usury.270 The court stated that under article 5069-1.06
the claim of usury was not assignable and the article limited recovery to
the obligor.271
The Fifth Circuit rendered an important decision on the choice of law to
be used in a usury case in Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-
Ingram Development Co. 272 wherein the court reversed its own prior deci-
sion.273 Prior to the court's first decision, out-of-state lenders could safely
apply the law of their residence to loan transactions when the negotiations
were at arms length, the borrower was sophisticated and represented by
competent counsel, the loan was not a consumer loan, the express choice of
foreign law was freely agreed upon, and the interest contracted for would
not be held usurious under the chosen foreign law.274 In Woods-Tucker a
Mississippi lender filed a claim in a chapter XI bankruptcy proceeding
instituted by a Texas debtor. Woods-Tucker had entered into an equip-
ment sale-leaseback transaction with the debtor and sought reclamation in
the bankruptcy proceeding wherein the debtor filed a counterclaim for
usury. The underlying documents expressly called for the application of
Mississippi law. Although there were no findings of fact that the loan doc-
uments constituted an "adhesion contract," in its first decision the Fifth
Circuit determined that Texas law should apply, placing strong emphasis
on the fact that the debtor was in dire financial straits and that the lease
was on a preprinted form.275
After being inundated with amicus curiae briefs, the Fifth Circuit re-
versed itself with respect to its prior conclusions on the usury choice of law
266. Id. at 465.
267. 610 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).
268. 615 S.W.2d 826, 828-29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1981, no writ).
269. Id. at 829.
270. 612 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ refd n.r.c.).
271. Id. at 88.
272. 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981).
2 73. 626 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1980).
274. See generally Pederson & Cox, Choice of Law and Usury Limits Under Texas Law
and the National Bank Act, 34 Sw. L.J. 755 (1980).
275. 626 F.2d at 405.
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issue.276 The court recognized the rights of parties under the Texas Uni-
form Commercial Code to choose the governing law so long as the juris-
diction bore a "reasonable relation" to the transaction. Under the facts of
Woods-Tucker, the court determined that Mississippi law bore a reason-
able relation to the transaction and its laws on usury should be applied.277
IV. GUARANTY/SURETYSHIP
A dearth of significant decisions interpreting existing guaranty and'
surety principles marked the survey period. The decisions that were re-
ported generally restated accepted principles and to comment on them,
therefore, is unnecessary. 278 One possible exception is the decision in G4f
Insurance Co. v. J W. Blair,279 in which contrary provisions between a
surety bond and a court order were reconciled against the surety. The
surety issued a bond on an administrator for the full and proper perform-
ance of all duties required of him under law. The order appointing the
administrator provided that his appointment would expire on March 31,
1975. Because the administrator's defalcation occurred sometime after
March 31, 1975, the surety argued that it had no liability under the surety
bond. The court disagreed and held that because the bond did not limit
the period of the surety's liability, and because the administrator was liable
under law for his defalcation notwithstanding the expiration of his ap-
pointment, the surety was liable for losses to the estate occurring after
March 31, 1975.280
V. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
Due to the breadth of this year's Article and the detailed treatment that
the practice and procedure under rule 185281 has received in past Survey
articles, 282 the discussion of creditors' rights in the area of collection ac-
tions is limited this year to the topics of prejudgment iiiterest and attor-
neys' fees. The rate of prejudgment interest recoverable in a collection
action was considered recently by the Fifth Circuit in Dallas--Fort Worth
Regional Airport Board v. Combustion Equpment Associates, Inc. 283 The
appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
276. 642 F.2d at 745-46.
277. Id. at 750.
278. See Brazosport Bank v. Travis, 617 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ciminelli v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 612 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1981), rev'd, 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 91 (Dec. 9, 1981); Malone v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 611 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd
n.r.e.); Balboa Ins. Co. v. K & D & Assocs., 589 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979,
writ refd n.r.c.); Insta/Com, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 589 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
279. 589 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
280. Id. at 787-88.
281. TEx. R. Crv. P. 185.
282. See Dorsaneo, Creditor and Consumer Rights.- Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw.
LJ. 253, 261-64, (1980); Dorsaneo, Creditor and Consumer Rights." Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 265, 274-78 (1979).
283. 623 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1980).
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awarding prejudgment interest pursuant to article 5069-1.05284 rather
than article 5069-1.03.285 The court reasoned that when a trial court
chooses to award equitable286 prejudgment interest rather than statutory
interest, the trial court has discretion under Texas law to award interest at
a rate greater than six percent per annum. 287 In this particular case the
court approved the trial court's award of prejudgment interest at the rate
of nine percent.288
The foregoing statement of Texas law is questionable, particularly in
light of the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Miner-Dederick Construction
Corp. v. Mid-County Rental Service, Inc. 289 The supreme court held that
prejudgment interest at the rate of six percent per annum was the correct
rate of interest to award in a suit involving a subcontractor's action for
recovery of extras.290 Also, the court in Miner-Dederick cited with ap-
proval the case of Pecos County State Bank v. El Paso Livestock Auction
Co. ,291 in which the El Paso court of civil appeals stated that six percent
was the maximum rate of prejudgment interest recoverable when sought at
common law as an element of damages.
292
An award of attorneys' fees was appealed in Life Insurance Co. v. Mur-
ray Investment Co. 293 The Fifth Circuit considered whether article
2226,294 after amendment in 1977295 and 1979,296 could be applied to an
action for breach of contract when the contract was entered into prior to
the effective date of the 1977 amendments, but the breach occurred and
action commenced subsequent to the 1977 amendments but prior to the
284. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981) pro-
vides for interest on judgment at the rate of nine percent per annum.
285. 623 F.2d at 1042. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1971-1981), provides that "[w]hen no specified rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties,
interest at the rate of six percent per annum shall be allowed on all accounts and contracts
ascertaining the sum payable ......
286. Why the court was even considering equitable prejudgment interest in this action is
unclear since statutory prejudgment interest was obviously recoverable pursuant to art.
5069-1.03. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480, 483-84
(Tex. 1978); First City Nat'l Bank v. Haynes, 614 S.W.2d 605, 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1981, no writ).
287. 623 F.2d at 1041. See Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V, 628 F.2d 308, 319 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 92, 70 L.Ed.2d 84 (1981).
288. 623 F.2d at 1042.
289. 603 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1980).
290. Id. at 200.
291. 586 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
292. 603 S.W.2d at 200.
293. 646 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3548 (Jan. 11, 1982); see
Villiers v. Republic Financial Services, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 566, 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brophy v. Brophy, 599 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tex-
arkana 1980, no writ).
294. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Article 2226 is the gen-
eral statutory provision covering award of attorneys' fees.
295. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 76, § 1, at 153. This amendment provided for the recov-
ery of attorneys' fees in "suits founded on oral or written contracts." Id.
296. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 314, § 1, at 718. Section 2 of the 1979 amendatory act
provided that the Act "is remedial in character and is intended to apply to all pending and
future actions, regardless of the time of institution thereof or of the accrual of any cause of
action asserted." Id. § 2.
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effective date of the 1979 amendments. The defendant argued that since
the action was tried prior to the effective date of the 1979 amendments,
awarding attorneys' fees would violate article I, § 16 of the Texas Constitu-
tion,297 which forbids retroactive laws.298 The court rejected this argument
on the ground that the constitutional prohibition did not apply to remedial
legislation. 299
In Findlay v. Cave300 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a
party could recover attorneys' fees incurred in connection with an action to
collect an amount owing under a contract found by a jury to be unfair and
unreasonable. The case involved a suit brought by an attorney to collect
$48,000 in fees pursuant to a contingent fee contract and in quantum me-
ruit. The jury found that the contingent fee contract was not just or rea-
sonable, but awarded plaintiff $5,624.23 in additional fees on his quantum
meruit claim.30 The jury also awarded the plaintiff $17,250 in attorneys'
fees incurred in prosecuting and appealing his action.302 The defendant
argued on appeal that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorneys'
fees under article 2226303 because the plaintiffs demand was excessive as a
matter of law in that the demand was based on an unjust contract, and the
demand was appreciably greater than the amount ultimately awarded by
the jury. The court rejected the defendant's argument, holding that a de-
mand "based precisely on the written contract between the parties" cannot
be excessive as a matter of law. 3°4
In Denta Rama, Inc. v. Lavastone Industries of Central Texas, Inc. ,305 a
sworn account action, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover attorneys'
fees and prejudgment interest even though the plaintiff mistakenly de-
manded payment in excess of the amount to which it was entitled under
the parties' agreement. 30 6 The defendant argued that the excessive de-
mand excused it from tendering payment in order to avoid liability for
attorneys' fees and expenses. The court agreed with the defendant that a
tender would have been unnecessary if the defendant could have estab-
lished that plaintiff would not have accepted it, but the court found that
the defendant's evidence was insufficient to show that the plaintiff would
have refused a tender of the amount actually owing under the contract.307
297. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16 provides: "no bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive
law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made."
298. 646 F.2d at 230.
299. Id.
300. 611 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. 1981).
301. Id. at 58.
302. Id.
303. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
304. 611 S.W.2d at 58.
305. 597 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
306. Id. at 510.
307. Id. at 509.
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VI. PREJUDGMENT AND POSTJUDGMENT REMEDIES
A. Garnishment
As a preliminary matter, the constitutionality of the prejudgment gar-
nishment procedure pursuant to a Texas statute30 8 and the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure 30 9 was upheld in Southwest Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. In-
ternational de Aceros, SA. 310
In Metroplex Factors, Inc. v. First National Bank 31' the application for
writ of garnishment contained a sworn statement that the affiant was "cog-
nizant of the matters recited herein" and that the affiant "has reason to
believe, and does believe" that the garnishee was indebted to the judgment
debtor.312 The trial court held that the foregoing recitations were insuffi-
cient statements for an affidavit in support of an application for writ of
garnishment. The appellate court agreed, holding that the affidavit re-
quired under rule 658 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 31 3 must state
"clearly, positively and unequivocally that the affiant was swearing to mat-
ters within his personal knowledge. '314
Small Business Investment Co. v. Champion International Corp.315 in-
volved the question of whether a garnishing creditor is entitled to the
funds held by the garnishee if the writ is never issued nor served on either
the garnishee or the judgment debtor, but both the garnishee and judg-
ment debtor voluntarily answer the application for the writ. Small Busi-
ness Investment Company of Houston (SBIC) initiated two postjudgment
garnishment proceedings against Exxon before another garnishing credi-
tor, Champion, applied for its own writ. In the first garnishment proceed-
ing a writ was issued and served on the garnishee, Exxon, and on the
judgment debtor, and judgment was entered for SBIC. In the second pro-
ceeding SBIC's application for the writ apparently was not served on Ex-
xon and the judgment debtor, and the writ was never actually issued.
Nevertheless, Exxon and the judgment debtor voluntarily answered the
application for the writ. Exxon also filed a petition impleading Champion
because Champion had also filed an application for a writ. The trial court
thereafter granted summary judgment for Champion due to SBIC's failure
to have its writ issued.
SBIC argued on appeal that it was not necessary for the writ to be issued
and served on the garnishee and judgment debtor because they had volun-
tarily answered the application. The appellate court agreed with SBIC
308. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (Vernon 1966).
309. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 658, 658a, 663a, 664, 664a.
310. 503 F. Supp. 76, 78 (S.D. Tex. 1980). This is the first reported decision upholding
the Texas prejudgment garnishment procedure.
311. 610 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
312. Id. at 865.
313. TEX. R. Civ. P. 658. Rule 658 provides that the application for writ of garnishment
"shall be supported by affidavits of the plaintiff... or other person having knowledge of
relevant facts." Id.
314. 610 S.W.2d at 865.
315. 619 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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that the garnishee could waive its right to be served with the writ by volun-
tarily answering the application, but stated that the garnishee could not
waive the judgment debtor's right to be served. 316 Also, the court stated
that the judgment debtor, by voluntarily answering the application, only
waived technical irregularities in the writ, not the necessity for issuance of
the writ and service of it on the judgment debtor.317
Two cases decided during the survey period considered the types of
debts that could be subject to garnishment. In Aetna Finance Co. v. First
Federal Savings & Loan Association 318 a judgment creditor attempted to
garnish a reserve fund held by a mortgagee to pay the mortgagor's real
estate taxes and insurance. The garnishor argued that the judgment
debtor's payments to the mortgagee were not payments on the indebted-
ness, but rather were bailments held in trust by the mortgagee, and there-
fore the funds should be subject to garnishment. 319 The court disagreed,
finding that the funds garnished were required to be paid into the reserve
fund by the terms of the real estate lien and note, and that the debtor had
no right to these funds once they were paid to the mortgagee. 320 Thus, the
fund was not subject to garnishment. The garnishing creditor did not fare
any better in Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Wy-Tex Livestock Co. ,321 in
which the court held that a garnishing creditor could not garnish rental
payments due to the judgment debtor when the payments had been uncon-
ditionally assigned to a third party prior to service of the writ on the
lessee.322
B. Sequestration
The only noteworthy sequestration case decided during the survey pe-
riod was Callaway v. East Texas Government Credit Union,323 involving an
action for wrongful sequestration. The Tyler court of civil appeals consid-
ered when a cause of action for wrongful sequestration arose under section
3(c) of article 6840,324 and what constituted "reasonable procedures" to
avoid a bona fide error under section 3(d). 325 Relying on Hufstedler v.
Harral,326 an action involving a claim of wrongful garnishment, the court
held that a cause of action under article 6840 for "wrongfully securing the
issuance of the writ" 327 arose when the writ was "'actually or construc-
tively placed in the hands of an officer for execution.' "328 The credit
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. 607 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
319. Id. at 313.
320. id. at 314.
321. 611 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
322. Id. at 171; see Adams v. Williams, 112 Tex. 469, 248 S.W. 673 (1923).
323. 619 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
324. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6840, § 3(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
325. Id. § 3(d).
326. 54 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1932, writ ref d).
327. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6840, § 3(c), (Vernon Supp. 1982).
328. 619 S.W.2d at 414. (quoting Hufstedler v. Harral, 54 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1932, writ. refd)).
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union argued that it was entitled to avail itself of the bona fide error de-
fense as it had utilized "on a regular basis, reasonable procedures to pre-
vent sequestering property in which it [had] no right to title and
possession. '329 The court held the credit union had failed to show that it
had adopted reasonable procedures to avoid the particular error, and,
therefore, the court dissolved the writ. 330
C Executions and Enforcement of Statutory Liens
The importance to judgment creditors of the recently enacted Texas stat-
ute providing for the collection of judgments by special court proceed-
ings3 3 1 was illustrated in Pace v. McEwen.332 A judgment creditor
initiated a proceeding under article 3827a 333 to have the judgment debtor's
homestead declared nonexempt under Texas law. 334 The trial court found
that the debtor's homestead was not exempt from execution and, pursuant
to article 3827a, ordered that the homestead be turned over to the sheriff
for sale under writ of execution. The judgment debtor argued on appeal
that the trial court's order to turn over his homestead for sale was im-
proper because the trial court had no jurisdiction under article 3827a to
consider issues other than the exempt or nonexempt status of the home-
stead.335 The appellate court held that the trial court had jurisdiction
under article 3827a not only to determine the exempt status of property,
but also to order the sale of property found to be nonexempt. 336
Jensen v. Bryson337 dealt with the issue of whether the holder of equita-
ble title to realty should be given preference over a judgment lien creditor,
whose rights were granted by the Texas recording statute,338 when the eq-
uitable title vested before the recordation of the judgment lien. The appel-
late court held that the purchaser's equitable title, which had vested by full
performance of the real estate contract, was superior to the rights of the
judgment lien creditor. 339 The court also held that the purchaser's open,
exclusive, and visible possessions of the realty constituted notice to the
judgment lien creditor of the purchaser's equitable interest, so that the
judgment lien could not operate as a lien against the realty.340
The Fifth Circuit recently decided a case of major importance involving
329. 619 S.W.2d at 415.
330. Id; see notes 82-93 supra and accompanying text.
331. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3827a(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982) allows a judgment
creditor to bring a special proceeding, in which he is entitled to the court's assistance, to
reach the debtor's property that is not exempt and that "cannot readily be attached or levied
on by ordinary legal process ...."
332. 617 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
333. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3827a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
334. See id arts. 3833-3836.
335. 617 S.W.2d at 819.
336. Id.
337. 614 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
338. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6627 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
339. 614 S.W.2d at 933.
340. Id.
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the enforcement of federal tax liens. In United States v. Rogers34' the
court held that the federal government cannot enforce a federal tax lien
against a taxpayer's family homestead in Texas if the taxpayer's spouse has
no federal tax liability.342 The court analyzed the enforcement issue in
terms of the nature of the interest created in favor of the property owner by
the particular state's homestead law, whether the homestead interest was
an exemption or was a property right.343 The court based this distinction
on the view that in the case of jointly owned property the attachment and
levy of federal tax liens involved only the taxpayer's interest in the prop-
erty and not the entire property.344 The court found that under Texas law
the homestead right was an "estate in land"; thus, the court held that a
federal tax lien could not be foreclosed against the homestead property so
long as the nontaxpayer spouse maintained the property as a homestead
under Texas law. 345
VII. CREDITORS' RIGHTS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
This year's Survey article expands the scope of topics discussed in the
area of creditors' rights to include cases relating to federal bankruptcy
law346 and Texas law on fraudulent transfers.347 The cases surveyed that
deal with bankruptcy law are all decisions rendered by Texas courts, and
all involve some interplay between Texas law and federal bankruptcy law.
The courts decided several bankruptcy cases dealing with the concept of
fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Act) 34 8 and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the Code). 349 The most important of
these decisions was Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co. 350 In
this case the Fifth Circuit held that the foreclosure of a real estate lien
pursuant to a power of sale in a deed of trust is a transfer 35' under the Act
341. 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981); see Ingram v. City of Dallas Dep't of Housing and
Urban Rehabilitation, 649 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981), in which the Fifth Circuit applied the
holding in United States v. Rodgers to a case involving the proceeds from the sale of a Texas
homestead. Id. at 1131-32. Certiorari has been granted in both cases. 102 S. Ct. 1748, 72 L.
Ed. 2d 160 (1982).
342. 649 F.2d at 1127-28.
343. Id. at 1123-24.
344. Id. at 1125.
345. Id. at 1127.
346. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980).
347. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.01-.05 (Vernon 1968).
348. 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(1976) (repealed 1978).
349. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (Supp. IV 1980).
350. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). See Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647
F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3548 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982), in which the
Fifth Circuit followed the Durrett opinion on the transfer issue. There was, however, a
strong dissenting opinion in which it was argued that a foreclosure sale, which is triggered
by the debtor's default under the deed of trust, should not be deemed a transfer by the
debtor under § 67(d)(2). 647 F.2d at 549. But see Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987
(Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), in which the bankruptcy judge refused to follow Durrett and
Abramson.
351. Transfer was defined under the Act to include "the sale and every other and differ-
ent mode, direct or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an interest
therein or with the possession thereof." 11 U.S.C. § 1(30)(1976) (repealed 1978).
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so that a sale of a bankruptcy debtor's property without fair considera-
tion 352 within one year of the debtor's filing a bankruptcy petition could be
set aside as a fraudulent transfer under section 67(d)(2) of the Act.353 The
Durrett court acknowledged that the actual transfer of title occurred at the
time the deed was delivered and the deed of trust was conveyed and filed,
which was more than one year before the bankruptcy petition was filed.354
The court, however, held that the " 'transfer' within the contemplation of
the Act, was not final until the day of the foreclosure sale," because until
that time the debtor retained possession of the property.355 After deter-
mining that the foreclosure sale constituted a "transfer made by . . . a
debtor" 356 under the Act, the Durrett court then had to determine whether
the transfer was fraudulent; that is, was it made "without fair considera-
tion"?357 The court found that the $115,400 sum paid by the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale was not fair consideration for the property in light of
the trial court's finding that the fair market value of the property at the
time of the foreclosure sale was $200,000.358
Neither Durrett nor the subsequent Fifth Circuit case of Abramson v.
LakewoodBank & Trust Co. ,359 which involved essentially the same issues
as Durrett, offers any helpful guidance on what constitutes fair considera-
tion in the context of a foreclosure sale. The Durrett court did, however,
imply that a foreclosure sale for 70% of the market value of the property
would be a "fair equivalent. '360 Although the Durrett court was dealing
with the transfer issue under the Act, the court's holding on this issue
should control subsequent cases decided under the Code, since the defini-
tion of transfer under the Code is as comprehensive as the definition under
the Act.36'
In Diversified World Investments, Ltd v. Omni International, Ltd 362 a
bankruptcy judge considered the transfer concept in the context of voida-
ble preferences under section 547 of the Code. 363 The debtor in bank-
ruptcy had purchased an aircraft and, as security for payment, assigned to
the seller the rental payments due to the debtor from the subsequent lease
of the aircraft to a third party. The assignment of the rentals to the seller
352. Id. § 107(d)(1)(E)(1).
353. 621 F.2d at 204. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(1976) (repealed 1978).
357. Id.
358. 621 F.2d at 203.
359. 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3548 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982).
360. 621 F.2d at 203.
361. In the Code, "transfer" is defined as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an
interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest." 11 U.S.C. § 101 (40)
(Supp. IV 1980). Also, the legislative history to this section indicates that transfer is defined
"as broad as possible." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 5787, 5963.
362. 12 Bankr. 517 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981).
363. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. IV 1980).
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was clearly made for an antecedent debt,3 64 but the assignment occured
outside the ninety-day preference period under section 547.365 Certain
rental payments, however, were received by the seller within ninety days of
filing. Therefore, the purchaser, as a debtor-in-possession, 366 brought an
action against the seller to recover the rental payments as voidable prefer-
ences under section 547(b) of the Code.367 The seller argued that the as-
signment of the rental payments to it was complete upon the execution of
the assignment; there was therefore no transfer within the ninety-day pe-
riod. 368 In ruling for the debtor, the court initially noted that for the pur-
poses of voidable preferences, "a transfer is not made until the debtor has
acquired rights in the property transferred. ' 369 Since the debtor did not
acquire any rights to the rental payments until each payment became due,
the court therefore concluded that the transfer of each rental payment was
not made until each rental payment became due. 370
Another important issue ruled upon by a bankruptcy judge during the
survey period was whether the debtor's conversion of nonexempt property
to exempt property prior to filing a bankruptcy petition might constitute a
fraudulent transfer under the Code, thus disqualifying the debtor from ob-
taining a discharge in bankruptcy. 371 In First Texas Savings Association v.
Reed 372 a debtor sold approximately $68,500 in nonexempt personal prop-
erty for $34,500 during the year before filing a petition in bankruptcy and
used these proceeds to pay a portion of the purchase money indebtedness
owing on his homestead. In doing so, the debtor candidly admitted that he
was converting nonexempt property to exempt property so as to put the
property beyond the reach of his creditors. 373 Consequently, the bank-
ruptcy judge found that the debtor convered nonexempt property to ex-
empt property "with the intent to defraud, delay or hinder a creditor or
other interested person," 374 which is prohibited under Texas law. 375 The
court therefore concluded that the debtor was not entitled to a discharge in
bankruptcy under section 727 of the Code,376 even though the legislative
history to section 522 of the Code stated that the conversion of nonexempt
property to exempt property before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
"is not fraudulent as to creditors. '' 377 The bankrupcty court found that the
364. Id. § 547(b)(2).
365. Id. § 547(b)(4).
366. See id. § 1107.
367. Id. § 547(b).
368. 12 Bankr. at 518-19.
369. Id. at 519 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1980)).
370. 12 Bankr. at 519.
371. See II U.S.C. § 727 (Supp. IV 1980).
372. 11 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
373. Id. at 687.
374. Id.
375. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
376. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (Supp. IV 1980).
377. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5963. The House Report, quoted at 11 Bankr. 687, states that
"'[a]s under current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert nonexempt property into
exempt property before filing a bankruptcy petition . . . The practice is not fraudulent as to
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comment to section 522 did not reflect the law in Texas because Texas law
contains an express statutory proscription against the conversion of nonex-
empt property to exempt property "'to defraud, delay or hinder a credi-
tor.' "378 In Driskil v. Reed 379 the trustee in bankruptcy sought to set aside
the same debtor's homestead exemption due to the debtor's conversion of
nonexempt property to pay real estate liens on the debtor's homestead.
The bankruptcy court refused to set aside the homestead exemption on this
ground because the court found that the Texas Constitution prohibited the
forced sale of the homestead for any purpose except to satisfy purchase
money liens, improvement liens, and tax liens.
3 8 0
In Cannady v. Wison, 38 1 the Fifth Circuit dealt with the important ques-
tion of the exemptions allowable under Texas and federal law to a hus-
band and wife who jointly file a petition in bankruptcy. The husband
claimed the urban homestead exemption 382 and the full personal property
exemptions allowable to a family under Texas law,383 and the wife claimed
personal property exemptions allowable under the Code. 384 The bank-
ruptcy court held that the wife could not claim personal property exemp-
tions under the Code because she had benefited from the Texas personal
property exemptions allowable to a family that her husband had
claimed. 385 On direct appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that in a
joint case a husband and wife could claim all exemptions allowable under
both state law and the Code, and the exemptions claimed by one spouse
did not diminish the exemptions available to the other spouse. 386 The
court based its decision on the fact that the exemption provisions of the
Code "[applied] separately with respect to each debtor in a joint case," 387
and on the fact that Texas law did not require the husband and wife jointly
to claim exemptions allowable to a family under Texas law.
3 88
Two bankruptcy cases dealing with the rights of mechanic's lien credi-
tors were also considered during the survey period. Boots Builders, Inc. v.
Hobson Air Conditioning, Inc. 389 involved a determination of a mechanic's
lien creditor's rights vis-A-vis the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy. The
trustee under section 544(a)(3) of the Code possessed the rights and powers
creditors, and permits the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to which he is entitled
under the law.'" (emphasis added by the court).
378. 11 Bankr. at 687-88, quoting TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(b) (Vernon Supp.
1982).
379. 12 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
380. Id. at 43-44 (citing TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 50).
381. 653 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1981).
382. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3833(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
383. Id. art. 3836(a).
384. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
385. 653 F.2d at 213.
386. Id. at 213-14; see In re Maitland, 13 Bankr. 923 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981), in which a
bankruptcy court upheld one spouse's entitlement to a homestead exemption under Texas
law and the other spouse's entitlement to a full wild card exemption under § 522(d)(5) of the
Code.
387. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (Supp. IV 1980).
388. 653 F.2d at 214; see TEx. Rv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3859 (Vernon 1966).
389. 11 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
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of a hypothetical "bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor,
against whom applicable law permits [the] transfer [sought to be avoided]
to be perfected. ' 390 The trustee in Boots Builders challenged the rights of a
creditor claiming a constitutional mechanics' lien under Texas law. The
court first noted that under Texas law a bona fide purchaser of real prop-
erty takes free of constitutional liens unless the lien has been perfected
pursuant to statute.39' Also, because Texas law permits a mechanic's lien
creditor to perfect his lien against a bona fide purchaser, the court held
that the lien was voidable by the trustee under section 544.392
In Community Investers IX, Ltd v. Phillips Plastering Co. ,393 a Houston
court of civil appeals considered the effect of a mechanic's lien creditor's
failure to seek relief from the automatic stay394 prior to foreclosing his
mechanic's lien in a state court action. The appellate court held that the
district court, from the time the bankruptcy petition was filed until an or-
der modifying the automatic stay was entered, had no jurisdiction over the
debtor's property in the foreclosure action pending before it.395 Conse-
quently, the district court's judgment for foreclosure of the mechanic's lien
was not merely voidable, as argued by the lienholder, but was void.396
VIII. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS UNDER TExAs LAW
In Anderson & Clayton Co. v. Earnest397 an appellate court considered
whether a bulk transferee could be held personally liable to the bulk trans-
feror's creditors for violation of the Texas statutes relating to bulk trans-
fers. 398 The court held that a bulk transferee could not be held personally
liable to the bulk transferor's creditors unless the creditors established that
the bulk transferee converted or disposed of the goods received from the
bulk transferor so as to put the goods beyond the reach of the bulk trans-
feror's creditors.399 Also, the court stated in a dictum that the transferee's
liability would be limited to the value of the goods transferred.40
The application of the clean hands doctrine in a suit to enforce a prom-
ise to make a fraudulent conveyance was considered in Leal v. Cortez.4° 1
The trial court granted an instructed verdict based on the equitable rule in
Texas prohibiting the enforcement of a promise by a fraudulent grantee to
reconvey land to a fraudulent grantor5 °2 The plaintiffs argued on appeal
390. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
391. 11 Bankr. at 639.
392. Id.
393. 593 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
394. FED. R. BANKR. 11-44.
395. 593 S.W.2d at 420.
396. Id.
397. 610 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarilo 1980, no writ).
398. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.101-.111 (Vernon 1968).
399. 610 S.W.2d at 848; see Southwestern Drug Corp. v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 141
Tex. 284, 172 S.W.2d 485 (1943).
400. 610 S.W.2d at 848.
401. 603 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
402. Id. at 264; see Bramlett v. Jenkins, 231 S.W.2d 539, 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1950, writ refed n.r.e.).
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that the defendants were not entitled to an instructed verdict because the
defendants had invoked the clean hands doctrine, yet had not shown that
they had suffered any injury, which plaintiffs contended was a prerequisite
to the application of the doctrine. 40 3 In rejecting this argument, the appel-
late court held that it was not necessary for the defendants to assert the
clean hands doctrine to defend against an action to enforce a promise to
make a fraudulent conveyance because of the specific rule in Texas against
enforcing such promises. 4°4
In Rucker v. Steelman40 5 the court considered the effect of a lis pendens
notice that was filed in connection with an action unrelated to the land
covered by the notice. The plaintiff in this case brought an action against
the defendants to remove the lis pendens as a cloud on his title. The lis
pendens notice was filed in connection with a tort action that defendants
had brought against the alleged fraudulent transferor, Mr. Patton. Before
a judgment was rendered in the tort action, Patton conveyed the property
in question to his brother and sister-in-law. After the constable's levy of
execution under the judgment against Patton in the tort action, but prior to
the recording of the abstract of judgment, Patton's grantees then conveyed
the property in question to the plaintiff, Steelman. The trial court found
that the transfers by Patton and by Patton's grantees were both made for
valuable consideration. The appellate court therefore held that "the de-
fendants had the affirmative burden of proving not only that [Patton's
grantees] but also the plaintiff had knowledge of facts or circumstances
sufficient to put a reasonably prudent person upon inquiry that Patton en-
tertained the intent to defraud his creditors at the time he executed the
conveyance in question. '406
Defendants argued that the lis pendens notice, which defendants had
filed against the property prior to the conveyance to plaintiff, constituted
constructive notice of defendants' claim and was sufficient to put plaintiff
on inquiry of Patton's fraudulent intent. The appellate court rejected this
argument, holding that a lis pendens notice filed in connection with an
action that did not involve the land covered by the notice was ineffective to
give notice.40 7 Consequently, the lis pendens notice filed by defendants in
connection with defendants' tort action did not constitute constructive no-
tice to plaintiff of the defendants' claim to the land.40 8
403. 603 S.W.2d at 264.
404. Id.
405. 619 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
406. Id. at 7.
407. Id.
408. Id.
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